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THE CHARTER: GLANCING BACK 
WHILE LOOKING FORWARD
The criminal justice system is alive and active in 
Canada. According  to the most recent statistics, there 
were almost 400,000 adult criminal cases before the 
courts involving  more than one million charges.[1] 
Cases investigated by police but not prosecuted 
would substantially increase the number of people 
caught up in the criminal justice net. In 1982, the 
enactment of the Charter  forever changed the 
landscape of the criminal justice system. It altered 
the way in which the police investigate, prosecutors 
prosecute, defence lawyers defend, and judges 
adjudicate.
Generally speaking, there are two broad phases 
within the criminal justice system; the investigative 
phase as well as the adjudicative phase.[2] The courts 
are tasked with balancing  individual rights against 
society’s interest in effective policing.[3] These 
countervailing  or competing  interests are also 
recognized by legal scholars in two well known 
criminal process models; the crime control model 
and the due process model.[4]
The crime control model has been described as 
resembling  an “assembly line”; police are concerned 
mostly with efficiency and factual guilt and 
investigate with the view that the trial is not of 
primary importance.[5] Police should be trusted, 
given broad investigatory powers, and this model 
does not worry about the odd rogue officer. Since 
factual guilt is the primary concern, the goal is to 
move the guilty to conviction and punishment. The 
ends justify the means.
The due-process model, on the other hand, is seen as 
an “obstacle course”, where defence lawyers, 
concerned mostly with fairness and legal guilt, may 
argue an accused’s rights have been violated and 
seek to ensure police are properly restrained during 
the investigative phase.[6] The due-process model 
recognizes the justice system’s propensity for human 
abuses and people, particularly the disadvantaged, 
are vulnerable given the superior power of the state. 
This system is also interested in the means and not 
just the ends. How the police “catch criminals” is 
important. 
!
Throughout the investigative process the Charter (in 
theory at least) imposes restraints or limits on police 
powers, presumably protecting  people against police 
abuses. Nowhere do law enforcement’s crime control 
goals and individual rights collide more frequently 
than in the area of criminal investigation, where the 
Charter is “animated at virtually every stage of police 
action”.[7] The Charter does not, however, impose 
obligations on the citizen nor grant police powers. 
The challenge for the police then, is to enforce the 
law by negotiating  the area where personal freedoms 
and the public interest intersect. In doing  so, the 
police, guided by the courts, must often translate 
abstract, constitutional guarantees into daily reality. 
Police powers to detain, search, and interrogate are 
curtailed by the rights found in ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10 of 
the Charter. These protections provide some 
safeguards for people from police misconduct and 
presumably bring  an appropriate balance between 
the state’s superior and coercive power and the 
constitutional rights of the individual. 
The effect of the Charter on Canada’s legal landscape 
has been profound.[8] There is no doubt that it has 
had a significant impact on Canada’s criminal justice 
system. Just as there have been successes attributable 
to this constitutional document there have also been 
failures or areas where it has come up short. Exactly 
where the Charter is headed has yet to be decided, 
but there is no doubt that it will no easy task for 
police officers to navigate. Endnotes at p. 2.
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POLICE LEADERSHIP 
APRIL 6-8, 2013
“Staying Connected in a Changing World” 
Mark your calendars. The British 
Columbia Association of Chiefs 
of Police, the Ministry 
of Public Safety and 
Solicitor General, and 
the Justice Institute of British 
Columbia Police Academy are 
hosting  the Police Leadership 
2013 Conference in Vancouver, 
British Columbia. This is Canada’s largest police 
leadership conference and will provide an 
opportunity for delegates to discuss leadership 
topics presented by world renowned speakers.
www.policeleadershipconference.com
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
CPR and AED. 
Alton Thygerson, Steven M. Thygerson, medical 
writers;! Benjamin Gulli, Gina Piazza, medical 
editors; American College of Emergency Physicians.
Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Learning, [2011], 
c2012.
RC 86.7 T463 2011
Creating your strategic plan: a workbook for 
public and nonprofit organizations.
John M. Bryson, Farnum K. Alston.
San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, c2011.
HD 30.28 B788 2011
Crime and elder abuse: an integrated perspective.
Brian K. Payne.
Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas Publisher, c2011.
HV 6626.3 P39 2011
Designing  and conducting  mixed methods 
research.
John W. Creswell, Vicki L. Plano Clark.
Los Angeles, CA: SAGE Publications, c2011.
H 62 C696 2011
Ethics for the public service professional.
Aric W. Dutelle.
Boca Raton, FL : CRC Press, c2011.
JL 111 E84 D88 2011
The excellent online instructor: strategies for 
professional development
Rena M. Palloff, Keith Pratt.
San Francisco, CA : Jossey-Bass, c2011.
LB 1044.87 P338 2011
Families count : profiling Canada's families IV.
Ottawa, ON: Vanier Institute of the Family, c2010.
HQ 560 P78 2010 
(Shelved in Reference Statistics Section)
First aid, CPR, and AED Standard.
Alton Thygerson, medical writer; Benjamin Gulli, 
medical editor; Gina Piazza, medical editor; 
American College of Emergency Physicians.
Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning, [2011], 
c2012.
RC 86.7 T473 2011
For better or for worse :  a practical  guide to 
Canadian employment law.
Randall Scott Echlin, Christine M. Thomlinson; with 
foreword by Frank Iacobucci.
Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, c2011.
KE 3109 E244 2011
Glimpses of light [videorecording]
[Vancouver, BC]: Orca Productions, 2010; 
Vancouver, BC: Moving Images
Distribution [distributor]
1 videodisc (ca. 17 min.) : sd., col. ; 4 3/4 in. + 
discussion guide.
This DVD does not have scene selection. "This film 
is an initiative of the Cultural Society working  group 
of the First Nation, Métis and Inuit Advisory 
Committee of the Mental Health Commission in 
collaboration with the Mood Disorders Association 
of Canada and the Native Mental Health 
Association." - Container. Different voices from 
diverse cultural backgrounds share life stories about 
the paths travelled while navigating  their experience 
of mental illness. Their messages are meant to serve 
as a catalyst for ongoing  discussion to deepen our 
understanding  of needs and experience of people 
who experience mental illness and, in particular, 
Aboriginal people and their families. They offer 
suggestions for a more holistic system that includes 
an approach of respect, not blame, and an 
unders tanding  of thei r need for cul tura l 
reconciliation. A health care provider comments that 
respect for the patient's personal experience is an 
essential first step along the path to healing.
RC 451.5 I5 G554 2010 D1230
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Perseverance.
Margaret J. Wheatley.
San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler Publishers, 
c2010.
BJ 1533 P4 W43 2010
Research methods in criminal  justice and 
criminology: an interdisciplinary approach.
Lee Ellis, Richard D. Hartley, and Anthony Walsh.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, c2010.
HV 6024.5 E43 2010
The stranger in the mirror : dissociation--the 
hidden epidemic.
Marlene Steinberg, Maxine Schnall.
New York, NY: Cliff Street Books, c2001.
RC 553 D5 S738 2001
Teaching  for experiential  learning:  five 
approaches that work.
Scott D. Wurdinger and Julie A. Carlson.
Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Education, c2010.
LB 1027.23 W86 2010
Tell  to win:  connect, persuade, and  triumph with 
the hidden power of story.
Peter Guber.
New York, NY: Crown Business, c2011.
HF 5386 G83 2011
Telling ain't training.
Harold D. Stolovitch and Erica J. Keeps with 
contributions from Marc J. Rosenberg.
Alexandria, VA: ATSD Press, c2011.
HF 5549.5 T7 2011
The truth about supervision: coaching, teamwork, 
interviewing, appraisals, 360 assessments, 
delegation and recognition.
by Anne O'Brien Carelli.
Springfield, IL: Charles C Thomas, c2010.
HF 5549.12 C355 2010
What parents need to know about teen risk 
taking: strategies for reducing problems related 
to alcohol, other drugs, gambling and Internet 
use.
David A. Wolfe ... [et al.].
Toronto, ON: Centre for Addiction and Mental 
Health, c2011.
RJ 506 R57 W43 2011
Zotero: a guide for librarians, researchers, and 
educators.
by Jason Puckett.
Chicago, IL: Association of College and Research 
Libraries, 2011.
PN 171 F56 P83 2011 
CONSTELLATION, NOT 
ISOLATION, JUSTIFIES DOG 
SNIFF
R. v. Chehil, 2011 NSCA 82
!! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !
The accused flew overnight on a 
Westjet flight from Vancouver to 
Halifax. He had no reservation but 
simply walked up to the ticket sales 
counter by himself and paid cash. He 
checked one locked suitcase. Meanwhile, a special 
police team, tasked to detect the flow of illegal drugs 
into the Halifax International Airport, consulted with 
local airline agents to identify travelers displaying 
suspicious patterns. After examining  the airline’s 
manifest, police noticed that the accused matched 
several established criteria. In their view, this 
collectively provided enough grounds for a dog  sniff 
search, including:
• The accused was travelling  on a flight from 
British Columbia, which the police knew as a 
source province for drugs.
• The ticket was bought with cash. The officers 
knew from their experience and training that 
drug couriers are paid by suppliers in cash and 
use cash to purchase their tickets to avoid a 
paper trail.
• The accused was flying on an overnight flight. 
The use of overnight or red!eye flights are 
typically preferred by drug  couriers because of 
the reduced police presence as well as the lower 
cost of such flights.
• The flight was a one!way flight with only one 
stop over, but no change of aircraft. This meant 
that the luggage loaded at the place of origin 
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would remain in the plane until it reached its 
destination.
• The accused was travelling alone. In the context 
of drug investigations travelling  alone means that 
fewer people know about the travel arrangements 
which reduces the risk of discovery either by the 
police or by other criminals who might want to 
take the product. Plus, travelling alone is less 
expensive than going with another person. 
When the flight arrived in Halifax, the accused’s 
bag, along  with nine other randomly selected bags, 
was set aside for sniffing  by a police dog  in a secure 
area of the airport. Police directed their Labrador 
retriever, which was specially trained to detect the 
scent of drugs, to sniff the bags. The dog  indicated 
on the accused’s suitcase. When the accused 
retrieved his suitcase from the public carousel, he 
was arrested, taken to a private room, and his bag 
was forced open and searched. Three kilograms of 
cocaine was found and the accused was charged 
with possession for the purpose of trafficking. !! !! !! !! !
At trial in Nova Scotia Supreme Court the accused 
argued that the dog  sniff and subsequent search of 
his suitcase as an incident to 
the arrest were unlawful. The 
trial judge agreed. As for the 
sniff search, the judge felt the 
pol ice d id not have the 
requisite reasonable suspicion 
to justify using  the dog, but 
rather were merely acting  on an 
“educated guess.” He found 
that the factors relied upon by police, even when 
considered cumulatively and in their totality, did not 
provide objectively reasonable suspicion that the 
suitcase contained drugs. In his view, only the cash 
purchase of a ticket at the last minute could perhaps 
be viewed as suspicious, but the rest of the factors 
were equivocal and clearly had innocent 
explanations. He also noted that the police could 
have taken additional steps to buttress their grounds 
for suspicion, such as speaking  to the accused, 
determining  the reason for the cash purchase, the 
one way travel, or why he was travelling  alone. 
“Exculpatory, neutral or equivocal information 
would appear to not have been considered,” said the 
judge. “The cumulative effect of the various factors 
did not ... establish a reasonable suspicion to believe 
that the [accused] was involved in criminal activity.” 
Since the sniff search was unlawful, the grounds for 
arrest evaporated. “The search was not based on the 
reduced standard of reasonable suspicion but rather 
on speculation,” said the judge. “The search was not 
lawful and the arrest which followed was unlawful.” 
The judge was not satisfied that forcing  open the 
suitcase was a search incident to a lawful arrest. The 
search was unreasonable and the evidence obtained 
from the s. 8  Charter breach was excluded under s. 
24(2). The accused was acquitted. 
The Crown challenged the trial judge’s ruling  to the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal arguing, in part, that 
both the sniff search and the search of the suitcase 
incident to arrest were lawful. In framing  the 
question to be answered in this case, Chief Justice 
MacDonald, authoring  the Court’s unanimous 
judgment, put it this way:
[T]he police had to meet certain standards to 
justify their actions.! For example, to justify the 
sniff search they required only a “reasonable 
suspicion” that the suitcase contained illegal 
drugs.! This is because such a search 
would be less intrusive.! However, to 
justify [the accused’s] arrest and 
incidental search of the suitcase, which 
is obviously more intrusive, the police 
required the higher standard of 
“reasonable and probable grounds” to 
believe that the suitcase contained 
illegal drugs. [para. 22]
Sniff Searches
The police are justified in using  a drug  dog  to sniff 
search a traveller’s luggage as long  as they act on a 
“reasonable suspicion” that a crime is being 
committed.! A reasonable suspicion is more than a 
hunch but less than the reasonable and probable 
grounds standard. In addition to the personal 
opinion of the police officer, the reasonable 
suspicion standard imports an element of objectivity. 
A court must be able to make an independent 
assessment of the facts upon which the police officer 
based their suspicion. 
“[T]o justify the sniff 
search they required only 
a ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
that the suitcase 
contained illegal drugs.!” !
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In this case, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the 
trial judge that the police lacked the requisite 
reasonable suspicion to use the drug sniffing dog:
[W]hen I view the “constellation of objectively 
discernable facts”, I see reasonable grounds for 
suspicion. In other words, I see ample 
uncontested evidence to justify a reasonable 
expectation that [the accused] was engaged in 
criminal activity. To be specific, consider the 
following evidence all of which, based on police 
intelligence, is consistent with the flow of illegal 
drugs:
- a Vancouver-Halifax flight  
- a walk up passenger travelling alone and 
paying cash! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! ! !
- the last ticket purchased for that flight! !! !! !! !! !! ! 
- just one relatively new suitcase that was 
locked! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! ! 
- an overnight flight !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! ! !
- one-way ticket
These factors, in my respectful view, 
converge to establish the requisite 
reasonable grounds to suspect. In 
reaching this conclusion, I am not 
overlooking the fact that each of these 
factors considered in isolation offers an 
innocent explanation. For example, 
many innocent people travel alone. 
Many may use overnight flights to save 
money. A certain percentage may walk 
up without a reservation. No doubt some 
still pay cash.! Not everyone has an old 
suitcase.
However, we must step back and look at 
the “constellation” of factors. In other 
words, our task is not to consider each factor in 
isolation to determine if there may be innocent 
explanations. ... [I]nstead of looking for a 
constellation of factors, [the trial judge] 
appeared to look at each in isolation and in 
doing so, dwelled on the corresponding 
innocent explanations. [paras. 36-38]
Chief Justice MacDonald found it was a mistake for 
the trial judge to consider that the police ignored the 
potential litany of innocent explanations. Although 
there were innocent explanations for each factor 
relied upon by the police, the test was whether 
“these factors coalesced into reasonable suspicion, 
despite a potential innocent explanation for each.” 
As for the police taking  additional steps to support 
their grounds for suspicion, they could have, but it 
was not necessary. “Could the police have done 
more?” asked Chief Justice MacDonald. “By all 
means. However, again, that is not the question. 
Instead, the question is whether in this case the 
police did enough to establish a reasonable 
suspicion. In my view they did and, respectfully, the 
judge erred in concluding  otherwise.” Thus, the 
officers had the requisite reasonable suspicion to 
direct the luggage sniff.
The! Arrest and Suitcase Search
Since there was no warrant to search the suitcase, 
the search was presumptively unreasonable. But the 
search could nonetheless be reasonable if the police 
had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused, 
believing  that the suitcase contained illegal drugs. 
The police dog  was trained to detect the smell of 
drugs and i ts handler 
testified to its reliability. The 
dog’s positive indication on 
the suitcase along  with the 
accused’s other suspicious 
travel patterns provided the 
necessary grounds to justify 
the arrest. “I conclude that 
the police, armed with the 
s u s p i c i o u s i n d i c a t o r s 
justifying  the sniff search, 
together with the added 
results from this search, had 
reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that [the accused] was in 
possession of illegal drugs,” said the Chief Justice. 
“His arrest was therefore justified, thus making  it 
reasonable for the police to search his suitcase.”! 
There were no Charter breaches in this case and 
therefore it was unnecessary to conduct a s. 24(2) 
analysis. 
The Crown’s appeal was allowed and a new trial was 
ordered.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
“These factors ... converge 
to establish the requisite 
reasonable grounds to 
suspect. In reaching this 
conclusion, I am not 
overlooking the fact that 
each of these factors 
considered in isolation offers 
an innocent explanation.” !
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2010 POLICE REPORTED CRIME
In July 2011 Statistics Canada 
released its “Police reported 
crime statistics in Canada, 
2010” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• there were 2,095,921 crimes (excluding  traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2010; this 
represents 77,039 fewer crimes reported when 
compared to 2009.
• the total crime rate dropped -5%. This includes a 
violent crime rate drop of -3% and a property 
crime rate drop of -6%.
YK
T-171.2
V-188.1
NV-164.7
T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
SK
T-148.2 
V-153.9
NV-145.9
AB
T-97.9
V-98.1
NV-97.8
BC
T-102.4
V-102.1
NV-102.5
QC
T-76.9
V-76.5
NV-77.0
ON
T-65.0
V-77.7
NV-60.2
MB
T-127.8
V-162.3
NV-114.5
NWT
T-340.2
V-325.2
NV-345.9
NU
T-345.7
V-505.7
NV-284.2
NB
T-69.0
V-68.4
NV-69.2
NF
T-80.2
V-70.2
NV-84.1
NS
T-83.5
V-84.5
NV-83.1
PEI
T-65.5
V-44.0
NV-73.8
Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2008 to 2009
SK 628 6,566 +3%
AB 399 14,865 -14%
PEI 511 727 +10%
BC 355 16,067 -8%
NF 416 2,119 +22%
NS 363 3,426 +8%
NB 350 2,628 +8%
MB 246 3,040 -18%
QC 208 16,424 -1%
ON 130 17,191 -7%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violnet CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2010, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2009”, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 21, 2011.
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YK
20,965
-10%
MB
10,187
-3%
SK
12,578
-2%
AB
8,084
-6%
BC
8,404
-6%
NWT
46,400
+11%
QC
4,770
-5%
ON
4,458
-5%
NF
6,725
+3%
NU
39,223
+4%
PEI
6,206
-1%
NB
5,496
-2%
NS
6,980
+1%
Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft Under $5,000 (non-motor vehicle) 536,151
Mischief 339,831
Break and Enter 196,881
Administration of Justice Violations 176,560
Assault-level 1 173,843
Disturb the Peace 117,903
Motor Vehicle Theft 92,683
Fraud 88,491
Impaired Driving 84,397
Uttering Threats 75,927
Homicide
There were 554 homicides reported, 56 less than the 
previous year. Ontario had the most homicides at 
189 (a +5% increase), followed by Quebec (84) 
British Columbia (83), and Alberta (77). Prince 
Edward Island reported no homicides while the 
Yukon and the Northwest Territories each reported 
only one homicide. As for provincial or territorial 
homicide rates, Nunavut had the highest (18.1 per 
100,000 population) followed by Manitoba (3.6), 
Saskatchewan (3.3), Yukon (2.9), Northwest 
Territories (2.3) and Nova Scotia (2.2). As for Census 
Metropolitan Areas (CMA), Thunder Bay, ON had the 
highest homicide rate at 4.2. The Canadian 
homicide rate was 1.6.
Canada
6,145
-5%
Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Thunder Bay, ON 4.2 Greater Sudbury, ON 2.4
Regina, SK 3.7 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 2.3
Saskatoon, SK 3.7 Moncton, NB 2.2
Winnipeg, MB 2.8 Saint John, NB 1.9
Edmonton,  AB 2.7 Kingston, ON 1.9
Halifax, NS 2.7 London, ON 1.8
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Robbery
In 2010 there were 30,405 robberies reported, 
resulting  in a national rate of 89 robberies per 
100,000 population. Manitoba had the highest 
robbery rate followed by Saskatchewan, British 
Columbia, and Ontario. 
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA 
rate of robbery in Canada (258), 
-13% lower than its 2009 rate. Saguenay, 
QC had the lowest rate (19) for the second 
year in a row. Three CMAs reported jumps of 
+20% or more in robbery rates; St. John’s, NF 
(+53%), Brantford, ON (+26%), and Kitchener-
Cambridge-Waterloo, ON (+20%).
• five CMAs reported declines in robberies of -30% 
or more; Saint John, NB (-50%), Kingston, ON 
(-50%), Trois-Rivieres, QC (-31%), Abbotsford-
Mission, BC (-30%), and Moncton, NB (-30%).  
Break and Enter
In 2010 there were 196,881 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 577 break-ins per 
100,000 people. Nunavut had the 
highest break- in rate (2,035 ) 
followed by the Northwest Territories 
(1,629) and Saskatchewan (938). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2009 to 2010
MB 176 2,177 -11%
SK 121 1,263 0
BC 108 4,878 -7%
ON 88 11,567 -6%
AB 86 3,213 -15%
QC 81 6,442 -6%
NWT 55 24 +84%
NS 52 486 -17%
YK 49 17 +84%
NU 42 14 -41%
NF 31 160 +37%
NB 19 142 -29%
PEI 15 22 +15%
CANADA 89 30,405 -7%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 258 Montreal, QC 142
Saskatoon, SK 199 Toronto, ON 128
Regina, SK 196 Edmonton, AB 118
Thunder Bay, ON 149 Calgary, AB 109
Vancouver, BC 147 Halifax, NS 95
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2009 to 2010
NU 2,035 676 +3%
NWT 1,629 713 -2%
SK 938 9,806 -1%
MB 819 10,116 -5%
YK 718 248 -6%
BC 692 31,346 -8%
QC 680 53,733 -9%
NF 667 3,399 +17%
AB 606 22,533 -5%
NS 558 5,259 +3%
PEI 515 732 +1%
NB 483 3,633 +4%
ON 414 54,687 -5%
CANADA 577 196,881 -6%
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• break-ins accounted for about 15% of all 
property crimes.
• 61% of break-ins were to a residence, 28% to a 
business location, and 11% to other locations, 
such as a shed or detached garage.
• residential break-ins dropped -4% while business 
break-ins declined -13%.
• from 2000 to 2010, the break-in rate dropped by 
-40%.
• among  CMAs, Saskatoon, SK reported the highest 
break-in rate (845) while Toronto reported the 
lowest (307) for a second straight year. 
Peterborough, ON (+27%), Saguenay, QC 
(+21%), and Moncton, NB (+13%) all reported 
double digit increases in the break-in rate, while 
Abbotsford-Mission, BC (-37%), Victoria, BC 
(-29%), Saint John, NB (-24%), Sherbrooke, QC 
(-19%), Kingston, ON (-17%), Regina, SK 
(-16%), Thunder Bay, ON (-16%), Vancouver, BC 
(-13%), Windsor, ON (-11%), Guelph, ON 
(-10%), and Ottawa, ON (-10%) all had double 
digit drops.
Drugs
In 2010 there were 108,529 
drug-related offences coming  to 
the attention of police. These 
offences included possession, 
t raf f icking, product ion or 
distribution. 
• p o s s e s s i o n o f f e n c e s 
accounted for 73,588 of 
these crimes - cannabis 
(56,870); cocaine (7,256); 
and other drugs (9,462). Other drugs include 
heroin, crystal meth, and ecstasy;
• the trafficking, production, 
and distribution offences 
totaled 32,974 - cannabis 
( 1 6 , 4 0 4 ) ; c o c a i n e 
(10,027); and other drugs 
(6,543).
• British Columbia had the highest drug  related 
offence rates of all 10 provinces for cannabis and 
cocaine. Nova Scotia was tops for other drugs.
• The territories continue to have some of the 
highest drug-related crime rates in Canada.
• Overall, drug  offences were up in 2010 (+10%) 
from 2009, mainly due to a +13% rise in 
cannabis offences.
Top Ten CMA Break-in Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Trois-Rivieres, QC 875 Vancouver, BC 787
Regina, SK 856 Brantford, ON 775
Saskatoon, SK 856 St. John’s, NF 766
Winnipeg, MB 810 Abbotsford-Mission, BC 727
Kelowna, BC 796 Gatineau, QC 713
10%
77%
13%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Possession Offences       
by Drug Type
30%
50%
20%
Other drugs
Cannabis
Cocaine
Trafficking, Production  & 
Distribution Offences     
by Drug Type
Drug-related Crime Rates by Province
per 100,000 population
Province Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
BC 421 106 64
SK 252 63 51
NS 251 34 46
QC 208 25 54
NF 205 38 67
NB 199 30 55
AB 195 76 37
ON 165 38 42
MB 157 58 30
PEI 108 22 41
Territory Cannabis 
rate
Cocaine   
rate
Other 
drugs rate
NWT 1,261 293 114
NU 1,039 15 18
YK 327 130 64
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Motor Vehicle Theft
In 2010 there were 92,683 motor vehicle thefts 
reported to police, down (-15%) from 107,992 in 
2009 and down -48% from a decade ago.
• on average there were 254 vehicles stolen per 
day in Canada in 2010.
• the motor vehicle theft rate was 272 per 100,000 
population.
• the most vehicles reported stolen was in Quebec 
(24,410) while the Yukon had the fewest vehicles 
stolen (160).
• eight CMAs reported declines in motor vehicle 
thefts of -25% or more; Trois Rivieres, QC 
(-41%), Guelph, ON (-37%), Brantford, ON 
(-31%), Peterborough, ON (-31%), Barrie, ON 
(-30%), Ottawa, ON (-30%), Moncton, NB 
(-27%), Victoria, BC (-27%), Edmonton, AB 
(-26%), and Kelowna, BC (-25%).  
Police Assaults
Assaulting  a police officer rose +45% from 2009 to 
2010. In 2010 there were 17,377 assault police 
officer offences compared to 11,837 the previous 
year. This increase may be attributable to new 
offences of assault with weapon/CBH to a peace 
officer and aggravated assault against peace officer 
which were recently added to the Criminal Code.
Police-Reported Motor Vehicle Thefts
Province/
Territory
Rate Motor Vehicle 
Thefts
Rate change 
2009 to 2010
NU 614 204 +2%
NWT 507 222 -5%
MB 453 5,596 -15%
SK 477 4,988 -8%
AB 411 15,298 -18%
BC 352 15,957 -20%
YK 463 160 +18%
QC 309 24,410 -11%
ON 171 22,611 -18%
NB 165 1,239 -4%
NS 136 1,282 -3%
PEI 79 113 -30%
NF 118 603 +30%
CANADA 272 92,683 -15%
Top Ten CMA Vehicle Theft Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Regina, SK 562 Saskatoon, SK 471
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 553 Edmonton, AB 446
Winnipeg, MB 503 Vancouver, BC 370
Kelowna, BC 494 Calgary, AB 369
Brantford, ON 474 Montreal, QC 361
CANADA’S TOP 10 
STOLEN VEHICLES
1. 2000 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
2. 1999 Honda Civic SiR 2-door
3. 2002 Cadillac Escalade 4-door 4WD
4. 2004 Cadillac Escalade 4-door 4WD
5. 2005 Acura RSX Type S 2-door
6. 1997 Acura Integra 2-door
7. 2000 Audi S4 Quattro 4-door AWD
8. 2003 Hummer H2 4-door AWD
9. 2006 Acura RSX Type S 2-door
10. 2004 Hummer H2 4-door AWD
Source: Insurance Bureau of Canada, December 16, 2010
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ABSENCE OF GROUNDS NOT A 
BASIS FOR SUPERINTENDENT TO 
REVOKE 24 HOUR PROHIBITION
Rapton v. B.C. (Motor Vehicles), 2011 BCCA 396
The Petitioner, Rapton, was served by 
a peace officer with a notice of 
driving  prohibition under s. 215(2) of 
British Columbia’s Motor Vehicle Act 
(MVA), suspending  his right to drive 
for 24 hours.!As a consequence of this prohibition, 
along  with his driving  record, his driver’s licence 
was suspended by the Superintendent of Motor 
Vehicles. He requested a review and revocation of 
the 24-hour prohibition pursuant to s.!215.1 of the 
MVA, but an adjudicator dismissed the application 
because neither of the two criteria found in s. 215.3 
for revocation had been satisfied:
• if the person subject to the prohibition was not 
the driver of the vehicle at the time, or
• if the person subject to the prohibition 
requested, and was refused, the opportunity for 
a breath test to indicate his blood alcohol level.!
The Petitioner’s request for judicial review by a 
British Columbia Supreme Court judge was 
dismissed. He then appealed that decision to the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal asking  that the 24-
hour prohibition be set aside.!
The Petitioner submitted that there was no evidence 
of reasonable and probable grounds for issuing  the 
prohibition because the “Officer’s Report” for the 
prohibition left the “Reasonable and Probable 
Grounds” portion blank.!In the absence of any such 
evidence, he suggested the prohibition could not 
stand.!The Superintendent of Motor Vehicles, on the 
other hand, contended that the only grounds upon 
which the prohibition could be revoked were set out 
in s.!215.3. Since the petitioner admitted he was the 
driver and had been given a breath test, the 
prohibition could not be revoked.! The appropriate 
remedy, suggested the Superintendent, was to seek 
judicial review of the peace officer’s decision to 
issue the prohibition, rather than the review process 
initiated under s. 215.1. 
Justice Prowse, delivering  the opinion of the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal, agreed with the 
Superintendent. The Superintendent had no power to 
revoke the prohibition based on an alleged absence 
of reasonable and probable grounds for its issuance 
in the first place.!“[T]he Superintendent’s powers are 
purely statutory, and, in conducting  a review of a 
Prohibition issued pursuant to s. 215(2) of the Act, 
are confined to those powers mandated in s. 215.3,” 
said Justice Prowse. “The Court has not been 
referred to any provision in the Act, or elsewhere, 
which suggests that, in addition to the statutory 
powers expressly set out in s. 215.3, the 
Superintendent has additional discretionary powers 
to set aside Prohibitions issued under s. 215(2).” She 
continued:
The l imited powers of review by the 
Superintendent in this regard appear to be 
consistent with the nature of s. 215 as a civil or 
administrative penalty, as opposed to a criminal 
sanction, designed to promote public safety by 
removing drivers showing indicia of impairment 
from the road for a relatively short period of 
time.! Section 215(6) provides an immediate 
BY THE BOOK:
24 Hour Driving  Prohibition Revocation: 
BC’s Motor Vehicle Act
s.  215.3  If, after considering  an application for 
review under section 215.1, the superintendent 
is satisfied that
(a)! the person on whom the notice of driving 
prohibition was served  had the right to request and 
requested  that the peace officer administer a test to indicate 
his  or her blood alcohol level but the peace officer failed  to 
provide the person with the opportunity to undergo the test, 
or
(b)! the person on whom the notice of driving  prohibition 
was served was not a driver within the meaning  of  section 
215(1),
the superintendent must revoke the driving prohibition.
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internal safeguard against wrongfully issued 
prohibitions by permitting the driver to request a 
breath test to demonstrate that his/her blood 
alcohol level does not exceed 50 mg of alcohol 
in 100 ml of blood.! It does not, however, 
provide the broad range of protections available 
to those charged with criminal offences, or the 
additional administrative protections provided to 
those who are prohibited from driving  for 90 
days, for example, under s. 94.1 of the Act 
(which is not in issue here).!  While it is true that 
the ultimate consequence for Mr. Rapton was a 
lengthy suspension of his licence, that was not 
the consequence of this Prohibition, per se, but, 
rather, the consequence of his driving record as 
a whole. [para. 17]
In this case, the Superintendent had no power to 
revoke the prohibition because the petitioner did not 
fall under either ss. 215.3(a) or (b) of the MVA. There 
was no basis for interfering  with the decision of the 
Supreme Court judge upholding  the Superintendent’s 
decision. The Petitioner’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
PSYCHOLOGICAL DETENTION 
REQUIRES s. 10(b) WARNING:
STATEMENTS EXCLUDED
R. v. Way, 2011 NBCA 92
!
The accused called 911 to report that 
her common law husband had 
slipped and fallen on a knife, 
stabbing  himself in the process.! At 
the time there were only four people 
in the house; the victim, the accused, and their two 
infant children. An ambulance and the police were 
dispatched to the home and the victim was 
transported to the hospital, where he was 
subsequently pronounced dead.! He had died as a 
result of a stab wound to the heart. Upon learning  of 
her husband’s death, the accused collapsed at the 
hospital. She was given medication to calm her and 
went to her mother’s home, where her children had 
also been taken. Police officers considered the death 
to be suspicious.! They secured both the residence 
and the deceased’s body in order to pursue their 
investigation.!The accused was asked to attend at the 
police station, arriving  with her mother between 
5:30-5:45 p.m.!  Two officers met them in the public 
lobby and the accused was taken through a security 
door to an interview room. Her mother was not 
allowed to accompany her daughter. Twice the 
accused’s mother asked if they should consult a 
lawyer and both times they were told “no”.
!
The accused was not advised of the right to call a 
lawyer nor given any of the usual cautions routinely 
provided before statements are taken from people 
suspected of a crime. She was also not informed she 
had no obligation to provide a statement or that she 
was free to leave. Instead, an officer told her to stay 
in the interview room and to advise the officer if she 
needed or wanted anything. At one point, the 
accused inquired whether she could leave and was 
told she could only leave when the interview was 
over. A videotaped interview started at 5:52 pm. The 
accused was first asked to write down everything 
that happened.! The interview then continued for 
more than two hours, with the interviewing  officer 
leaving  the room from time to time to consult with 
another officer. Upon returning  from one of these 
exits at 7:57 pm, the officer determined it was time 
to comply with s. 10(b) because the police had 
received information from a confidential source that 
the accused had killed her husband. The accused 
was informed that the police were now investigating 
a murder and she was told she had “the right to 
retain and instruct legal counsel without delay,” be it 
a lawyer of her choice or a legal aid lawyer. The 
usual cautions were also given. When asked what 
she wanted to do about her right to contact a lawyer, 
she replied “I don’t know, my mom’s here.”!  When 
the question was repeated, she answered, “I didn’t 
do anything.”! The interview resumed and the 
accused eventually explained she had stabbed her 
husband in self-defence. The accused was 
subsequently charged with second degree murder.!
!
At trial in the New Brunswick Court of Queen’s 
Bench the accused brought a motion! that her 
statements were given in breach of her s.!10(b) rights 
and the evidence was inadmissible under s. 
24(2).!The Crown, on the other hand, submitted that 
none of the accused’s Charter  rights were infringed 
and that, even if they were, the admission of the 
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statements into evidence would not bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute.! The Crown 
called police officers to testify. The officers 
acknowledged that the death was considered 
suspicious, but that they were only investigating  an 
accident until they were advised of the information 
given by the confidential informant. 
The judge agreed that the accused’s s. 10(b) rights 
had been breached. Although the accused attended 
the police station of her own accord, the judge 
found she felt obliged to do so.!She was then taken 
through a secure door into a controlled area of the 
station and to a closed-door interview room.! Her 
mother was not allowed to accompany her and was 
twice told there was no need for her to call a lawyer.! 
While in the interview room she was instructed that 
if she needed or wanted something  when the officer 
was not present, she was to knock on the door and 
wait for the officer to respond. She was questioned 
repeatedly for over two hours and was never advised 
she was free to leave.! The judge found that 
psychological detention had occurred; a reasonable 
person in the accused’s circumstances would have 
concluded by reason of the police conduct that she 
had no choice but to comply.!He found the Charter 
breach was not “an inadvertent or minor violation” 
and very close to “the level of willful or flagrant” 
conduct.! He also recognized that both the right to 
counsel and the right against self-incrimination are 
important rights that are fundamental to the 
administration of justice. Finally, in considering  !the 
reliability of the evidence, the seriousness of the 
offence, and the importance of the evidence to the 
prosecution’s case, he concluded the evidence 
should be excluded under s. 24(2). The accused was 
acquitted.
!
The Crown appealed the acquittal, 
arguing  the trial judge erred in 
finding  a violation of the accused’s 
Charter rights. In the Crown’s 
view, the trial judge misapplied 
the test for determining  whether 
the re was a psycholog ica l 
detention that triggered s. 10(b). 
Since the officer asking  the 
accused to attend for the interview 
did not have reasonable grounds 
for believing  she was responsible for stabbing  the 
victim, their intent was simply to get a statement 
regarding  the accident. The officer did not intend nor 
consider her detained. For example, the officer left 
the room on several occasions. At one point the 
officer called a social worker to assist the accused in 
informing  her children of the death of their father 
and the accused was allowed to use the washroom 
in the presence of her mother. The accused 
suggested the Crown was placing  too much 
emphasis on the subjective view of the police and 
not on the view of the reasonable person in her 
position. Regardless of subjective belief, the test is 
an objective one; whether a reasonable person in 
her position would have felt obliged to follow the 
police’s directive.
!
Detention & s. 10(b) Charter
!
Justice Richard, authoring  the unanimous New 
Brunswick Court of Appeal opinion, recognized that 
if the accused was detained before she was advised 
of her rights then she should have been told of them 
without delay upon commencement of the 
detention.!If she was not detained prior to her rights 
being  given, then there would be no s. 10(b) breach. 
The issue in this case was whether the accused had 
been psychologically detained. Justice Richard 
stated:
!
Psychological restraint can arise when there is a 
legal requirement for the subject to comply with 
a direction or demand, for example in the case 
of a demand to provide a breath sample in a 
roadside screening device. However, it can also 
occur, in the absence of a legal requirement to 
comply, in situations where a reasonable person 
in the subject’s position would feel 
obligated to comply with a police 
officer’s direction or demand.! The 
rationale for including  this type of 
restraint as part of the definition of 
“detention” in ss. 9 and 10 of the 
Charter is that “[m]ost citizens are not 
aware of the precise legal limits of 
police authority” and “[r]ather than 
risk the application of physical force 
or prosecution for willful obstruction, 
the reasonable person is likely to err 
on the side of caution, assume lawful 
“[Psychological restraint] 
can also occur ... in 
situations where a 
reasonable person in the 
subject’s position would 
feel obligated to comply 
with a police officer’s 
direction or demand.” !
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authority and comply with the demand”.
The inquiry to determine whether there has been 
psychological restraint without a legal 
requirement to comply is an objective one.!“The 
question is whether the police conduct would 
cause a reasonable person to conclude that he 
or she was not free to go and had to comply 
with the police direction or demand”.!  Thus, in 
the present case, the relevant question is 
whether a reasonable person in [the accused’s] 
situation would have felt she had an obligation 
to comply with the officers’ demand for a 
statement. The inquiry “involves a realistic 
appraisal of the entire interaction as it 
developed, not a minute parsing of words and 
movements” … “[I]n those situations where the 
police may be uncertain whether their conduct 
is having a coercive effect on the individual, it is 
open to them to inform the subject in 
unambiguous terms that he or she is under no 
obligation to answer questions and is free to go”. 
[references omitted, paras. 28-29]
!
In determining  whether a reasonable person in all of 
the circumstances would conclude they had been 
deprived of the liberty of choice, a court is required 
to consider the following factors:
!
• The circumstances giving  rise 
to the encounter as they 
would reasonably be perceived by 
the individual:
! whether the police were
!  providing general assistance; 
! maintaining general order; 
! making  general inquiries 
r e g a r d i n g  a p a r t i c u l a r 
occurrence; or
! singling  out the individual for 
focussed investigation.
• The nature of the 
police conduct, 
including  the language used; the 
use of physical contact; the place 
where the interaction occurred; the 
presence of others; and the 
duration of the encounter.
• The particular characteristics 
or circumstances of the 
individual where relevant, including  age; 
physical stature; minority status; level of 
sophistication.!
!
In this case, the Court of Appeal found that the trial 
judge properly applied these factors. There was 
psychological restraint at the outset of the interview 
sufficient to trigger s. 10(b).!While the accused was 
an adult, she was young, not assertive or confident, 
and unsophisticated. “Thus, the question is whether 
a reasonable young, non-assertive, not confident and 
unsophisticated person would have felt obliged to 
coopera te wi th the inves t i ga t ion in the 
circumstances,” said Justice Richard:
!
The accident reported to the 911 service 
involved a stabbing  that eventually led to the 
death of a man.! Any reasonable person would 
expect that, in those circumstances, the police 
would want to investigate the “accident”.!This is 
not a case where the police are providing 
general assistance, maintaining general order or 
making  general inquiries regarding a particular 
occurrence.! It is a case where the investigators 
considered [ the vict im’s] death to be 
“suspicious”.! Any other characterization would 
have been absurd.! One does not generally 
expect an individual to fall on a 
knife, stabbing  himself through 
the heart. The police were aware 
only two adults had been in the 
home when [the victim] was 
stabbed and they necessarily had 
to single out [the accused] for 
focused investigation.! While it 
may be that initial inquiries made 
at the scene or even at the 
hospital might be characterized 
differently, the fact is that what 
occurred at the police station was 
a focused investigation involving 
[the accused].! If she had simply 
been a s ked t o p rov ide a 
statement as to what happened 
and no more, the situation might 
then also be characterized 
differently. However, she was 
repeatedly questioned for two 
hours; evidence that, in the 
circumstances, she was the 
“The inquiry to 
determine whether there 
has been psychological 
restraint without a legal 
requirement to comply is 
an objective one.!‘The 
question is whether the 
police conduct would 
cause a reasonable 
person to conclude that 
he or she was not free to 
go and had to comply 
with the police direction 
or demand’.” !
conduct
circumstances
characteristics
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subject of a focused investigation.
!
I agree with the trial judge that a 
reasonable person in [the accused’s] 
situation would not have felt detained 
when the officers attended at her 
mother’s home and asked her to attend 
at the police station.! However, the 
outlook of the reasonable person 
would take a dramatic change when, 
having  arrived at the police station, the 
person is taken to a controlled part of 
the police station to a closed-door 
interview room and told that if 
anything was needed or wanted to 
knock on the door. At that point, a 
reasonable person’s perception of any freedom 
to leave would be significantly diminished.! 
When one adds to that being an unsophisticated 
young  person who was advised her mother can’t 
attend for the interview and was effectively told 
she cannot leave until the interview is over, the 
reasonable person would obviously perceive the 
enjoyment of his or her liberty as drastically 
curtailed.
!
…!  In some instances, there will be little doubt 
that a reasonable person would expect to be 
questioned and would know he or she is not 
being detained so as to trigger s. 10(b) of the 
Charter.! However, in other circumstances the 
line may be difficult to discern between 
situations where a reasonable person would feel 
free to walk away and those where an individual 
would reasonably feel compelled to incriminate 
himself or herself.! In those instances, the 
majority of the Supreme Court has given police 
investigators a tool to ensure the line remains 
clear.! Where there is uncertainty, the police may 
choose to “inform the person that he or she is 
under no obligation to answer questions and is 
free to go” or otherwise they risk the possibility 
that “a detention may well crystallize” requiring 
the need to advise the person of his or her s. 
10(b) rights.
!
I pause to add that there may be situations 
where the police advise a person that he or she 
is under no obligation to answer questions and is 
free to go, which would still result in a finding of 
psychological restraint. However, detention will 
certainly be much more difficult to establish 
when such information has been 
genuinely provided. [references 
omitted, paras. 37-40]
!
Here, the accused was not advised 
she was under no obligation to 
answer questions and that she was 
free to go.! “In fact, the situation 
suggested she was not free to go,” 
said Justice Richard. “She was 
taken without her mother to a 
secured area of the police station 
to a closed-door interview room, 
told to knock on the door if she 
needed or wanted anything, 
repeatedly questioned for two hours and told she 
would be allowed to leave when the interview was 
over.” The failure of the police to make it clear to the 
accused that she had no obligation to answer their 
questions and was free to go crystallized a detention 
before she was interviewed and she should have 
been advised of her right to counsel. Since she was 
not provided with her right to counsel upon 
detention a s. 10(b) violation occurred.
!
s. 24(2) Charter Analysis
!
The s. 24(2) Charter framework requires a court to 
balance the effect of admitting  the evidence on 
society’s confidence in the justice system having 
regard to:
!
• the seriousness of the Charter-infringing  state 
conduct (admission may send the message the 
just ice system condones serious s tate 
misconduct);
• the impact of the breach on the Charter-
protected interests of the accused (admission 
may send the message that individual rights 
count for little) and;
• society's interest in the adjudication of the case 
on its merits”.
!
Balancing  the results of these three lines of inquiry, 
the Court of Appeal ruled that all factors favoured 
exclusion. In this case the Charter breach was not a 
minor nor inadvertent slip, but more on the serious 
side:
!
“[T]he line may be 
difficult to discern 
between situations 
where a reasonable 
person would feel free to 
walk away and those 
where an individual 
would reasonably feel 
compelled to incriminate 
himself or herself.”
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… The officers knew or ought to have known 
they were focusing  their investigation of Mr. 
Richard’s suspicious death on [the accused’” 
said Justice Richard. “They knew or ought to 
have known she was a young, non-assertive and 
unsophisticated individual.! Yet, knowing  the 
possible legal consequences for [the accused], 
the officers refused to allow her mother to be 
present with her, twice asserted she did not need 
a lawyer, questioned her for two hours under the 
guise they simply wished to determine how the 
accident occurred and told her she could only 
leave once the interview was finished. Note that 
I am not saying  the officers had any obligation to 
allow [the accused’s] mother to be present for 
the interview, just that they did not do so.!!
!
As stated earlier, a reasonable person in [the 
accused’s] situation would have felt detained 
and would certainly not have believed having 
the freedom to refuse to answer and leave.! If a 
reasonable person would have perceived the 
situation like this, it seems inconceivable that 
two experienced police officers would not have 
come to the same conclusion. However, since 
the trial judge stopped short of finding a flagrant 
violation, I will do the same and, as he did, 
place this violation on the serious side of the 
spectrum without going to the extreme end.! 
[paras. 49-50]
!
The Charter-protected interests in this case involved 
not only the right to counsel, but also the right to 
silence, and there were no circumstances that might 
have attenuated the impact of the s. 10(b) 
violation.! “This was not a case of a spontaneous 
utterance or a situation where the individual was 
specifically informed it was his or her choice to 
speak to the police,” said Justice Richard. Plus, 
sometimes there is reason to doubt the reliability of 
statements taken in contravention of the Charter.! 
Even the Crown did! not consider these as a reliable 
source of the truth. In the first statement, the accused 
maintained it was an accident.! In the second 
statement, she asserted self-defence, yet she was 
charged with second degree murder. The exclusion 
of the statements was necessary so as not to bring 
the administration of justice into disrepute.
!
The Crown’s appeal was dismissed.
!
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
COMPUTER WARRANT DOES 
NOT CARRY UNTRAMMELED 
RIGHT TO RUMMAGE  
R.!v.!Jones,!2011 ONCA 632
!
The police investigated the accused 
for a fraud related to the purchase of 
a motorcycle listed for sale on e-Bay. 
They believed he had participated in 
a f raudulent In ternet scheme 
involving  the sale of the motorcycle and that the 
invoice for the transaction was a computer 
generated forgery.! Police obtained a warrant 
authorizing  the search and seizure in his residence 
of data relating  to certain e-mail transactions, images 
relating  to counterfeit items, and any electronic data 
processing  and storage devices, personal computers 
and computer systems. The terms of the search 
warrant, which contained no restrictions on the 
types of computer files that could be searched, were 
broad and authorized the police to seize a number 
of things, including  any computers and related 
equipment. Before starting  his inspection of the 
computer’s two large hard drives, the police analyst 
concluded that it was necessary to search all 
document and image files for evidence of the 
fraud.! Since the warrant contained no date 
limitation, the analyst did not limit his search to any 
particular date range.!During  his initial review of the 
document and image files, the analyst found images 
that he believed constituted child pornography. 
Crown counsel was contacted to determine whether 
a warrant should be obtained to search for further 
child pornography.! The advice received from a 
seasoned Crown Attorney was that a full 
examination of the hard drives would be allowed, 
even looking  at video files that the analyst would not 
have examined if the search had been confined to 
looking  for evidence related to only the fraud 
investigation. As a result, the full examination of the 
hard drives yielded 57 images and 31 videos of child 
pornography. The accused was charged with 
possession of child pornography. !
!
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
judge concluded that the accused’s s. 8 Charter 
rights protecting  him against unreasonable search 
and seizure were breached because the warrant did 
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not authorize a review of the computer hard drive 
for anything  other than evidence of fraud.!The judge 
found the Crown advice given to the police was 
“reckless and cavalier” and symbolic of an 
institutional failure. The child pornography found as 
a result of the search was excluded and the charges 
were dismissed.!An acquittal was entered.
!
The Crown challenged the trial judge’s ruling  to the 
Ontario Court of Appeal, arguing  the trial judge 
erred in finding  a s.! 8 Charter breach. First, in the 
Crown’s view, the search warrant itself properly 
authorized the seizure of child pornography 
evidence because the warrant placed no limitations 
on the police and they were therefore entitled to 
make a full examination of the entire computer 
contents including  a search for child pornography. 
Second, the manner of the search was reasonable; 
the officer’s conduct showed appropriate regard for 
the accused’s Charter rights. Finally, the “plain view 
doctrine” and s. 489 of the Criminal Code applied in 
the computer context and supported a legal search 
for and seizure of child pornography.
!
Justice Blair framed the question on appeal as, 
“What happens when the police are lawfully 
searching  a computer pursuant to a valid warrant for 
one crime and they discover evidence of another – 
are they permitted to continue the computer search 
for further evidence of the second crime without 
another warrant?” To answer this question, the Court 
of Appeal had to determine “whether the search for 
evidence of child pornography was authorized by 
the terms of the warrant itself or, if not, whether it 
was otherwise authorized in law and conducted in a 
reasonable manner.” Before addressing  the essential 
issue, Justice Blair briefly recited the principles 
underlying s. 8 of the Charter:
!
A search and seizure is only lawful if it is 
authorized by law and if both the law and the 
manner in which the search is carried out are 
reasonable.! The onus is on the person seeking  to 
establish the breach to show that his or her s. 8 
rights have been violated.!A warrantless search is 
prima facie unreasonable, however, and 
therefore a breach of s. 8, and the onus is on the 
Crown in such circumstances to prove that such 
a search was reasonable.
!
To give effect to the s. 8  right involves an 
assessment in each case of whether the public’s 
interest in being left alone by government must 
give way to the government’s interest in 
intruding on the individual’s privacy in order to 
advance its goals – in particular, those related to 
law enforcement.!The Charter’s bias is in favour 
of the former and, accordingly, in order to 
prevent unjustified searches, a legally valid pre-
authorization, such as a warrant, is a pre-
condition to a lawful search and seizure, where 
it is feasible to obtain one.!
!
[T]he primary value underpinning the s. 8  right 
is the need to protect an individual’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the target of the 
proposed search against unreasonable intrusion 
by the State. The privacy expectat ion 
encompasses not only property interests but 
personal and informational privacy too.! 
[references omitted, paras. 19-21]
!
In this case, the Court was concerned with the 
accused’s reasonable expectation of informational 
privacy.
THE CROWN ADVICE
The Crown Attorney providing the legal 
advice in this case was very  experienced in 
matters relating to search and seizure. He 
had practiced for 21 years and for 11 years 
was  a co-director  of the Search and Seizure 
course at the Ministry of the Attorney 
General’s summer  “Crown School” attended 
by prosecutors from across the country. "He 
was  a designated wiretap agent and had 
lectured widely to lawyers and police on a 
variety of search and seizure issues.He was 
also providing legal advice to police several 
times  a week, most frequently with respect 
to search and seizure issues. 
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The Warrant Itself
!
Justice Blair found that the trial 
judge was correct in holding  that 
the warrant itself was valid for 
purposes of authorizing  the search 
for evidence of fraud, but that it 
did not authorize a search for 
evidence of child pornography 
other than that found in the data 
image fi les.! “Although [the 
warrant] contained no limitations on the types of 
files that could be examined, it was reasonably 
focused and limited in the types of evidence the 
police could seek; and that evidence did not include 
evidence of child pornography,” he said. And further:
!
I do not accept that the right to examine the 
entire contents of a computer for evidence of 
one crime (fraud, in this case) carries with it the 
untrammelled right to rummage through the 
entire computer contents in search of evidence 
of another crime (possession of child 
pornography, in this case) without restraint – 
even where, as here, the warrant may properly 
authorize unlimited access to the computer’s 
files and folders in order to accomplish its search 
objectives.! A computer search pursuant to a 
warrant must be related to the legitimate targets 
respecting which the police have established 
reasonable and probable grounds, as articulated 
in the warrant.
!
Here, that focus has been accomplished not by 
limiting  access to the contents of the computer 
but – as described above – by framing the type 
of evidence that may be sought (evidence 
relating to the email transmissions and to 
counterfeit images) and the crimes to which that 
evidence relates (possession of stolen property 
and forgery).!  The focus on the type of evidence 
being sought, as opposed to the type of files that 
may be examined is helpful, it seems to me, 
particularly in cases where it may be necessary 
for the police to do a wide-ranging  inspection of 
the contents of the computer in order to ensure 
that evidence has not been concealed or its 
resting place in the bowels of the computer 
cleverly camouflaged.
!
To the extent they are required to examine any 
file or folder on the computer to reasonably 
accomplish that authorized 
search, the police are entitled 
to open those files and folders 
and to examine them, at least 
in a cursory fashion, in order to 
determine whether they are 
likely to contain evidence of 
the type they are seeking. 
[paras. 42-44]
!
Here, the police could have 
obtained a second warrant to 
search for evidence of child pornography.! The 
computer search was being  performed off-site and 
post-seizure. There was no urgency and nothing 
prevented the police from applying  for another 
warrant.
!
The Court of Appeal also rejected the Crown’s 
argument that the warrant authorized the search 
One Seizure Fits All?
Example’s used, but rejected, to support the 
Crown’s one seizure fits all analogy included:
• a suspect’s clothing  seized under a warrant in 
a sexual assault investigation may later be 
tested for semen in the context of a 
subsequent murder investigation.
• body samples (scalp and pubic hair) given on 
consent with a view to eliminating  an 
individual as a suspect in one murder case 
were properly tested for a DNA match in 
connection with a second murder. 
The rationale for the one seizure fits all analogy is 
that no reasonable expectation of privacy remains 
in an object once it has been lawfully obtained by 
the police for the purpose of criminally 
investigating  the suspect. However, the analogy 
between forensic testing  of a physical object and 
the examination of the contents of a computer, 
was rejected by the Court of Appeal. With a 
physical object, information is generated by the 
physical characteristics of or adhering  to the 
object targeted.!In the case of a computer, it is the 
informational contents of the computer itself that 
is the target of the search.
“A computer search pursuant 
to a warrant must be related to 
the legitimate targets 
respecting which the police 
have established reasonable 
and probable grounds, as 
articulated in the warrant.” !
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because a computer is an indivisible object which, 
like pieces of physical evidence, can be tested and 
inspected in whatever ways the police deem 
necessary once lawfully seized under the warrant.!In 
other words, just because the warrant contained no 
limiting  terms with respect to the parts of the 
computer that could be searched, a full examination 
of all the data stored on the computer (as if it is one 
indivisible item) was not properly authorized. 
Rather, the police were not entitled to roam around 
through the contents of the computer in an 
indiscriminate fashion without further authorization. 
The police have access to software, technology and 
expertise enabling  them to focus on the files they 
think will generate the evidence they are looking for.!
!
“Plain View” and s. 489 Criminal Code
!
There are times when “the discovery of evidence 
pointing  to a second (and unanticipated) crime can 
piggy-back onto the lawful execution of a computer-
search warrant directed at a different crime”! 
through the plain view doctrine or s. 489 of the 
Criminal Code. Both the common law plain view 
doctrine and s. 489 are exceptions to the general 
rule that a warrantless search is unreasonable and, 
therefore, violative of s. 8.! This can occur when a 
lawfully conducted search of data and image files for 
evidence of one crime (such as fraud) results in the 
discovery of image files of another crime (such as 
child pornography). Justice Blair described the plain 
view doctrine as follows:
!
The “plain view” doctrine operates when a 
police or peace officer is in the process of 
executing  a warrant or an otherwise lawfully 
authorized search with respect to one crime and 
evidence of another crime falls into plain view.! 
Resort to this common law power is subject to 
the following restraints, however:
(i) The officer must be lawfully in the place 
where the search is being conducted (“lawfully 
positioned”, in the language of the authorities);
(ii) The nature of the evidence must be 
immediately apparent as constituting a criminal 
offence;
(iii) The evidence must have been discovered 
inadvertently;
(iv) The plain view doctrine confers a seizure 
power not a search power; it is limited to those 
items that are visible and does not permit an 
exploratory search to find other evidence of 
other crimes. [references omitted, para. 56]
!
In this case, plain view and/or s. 489 could only 
justify the seizure of the images of child 
BY THE BOOK:
Criminal Code: s. 489
s. 489 (1) Every person who executes a 
warrant may seize, in addition to the 
things mentioned in the warrant, any 
thing  that the person believes on 
reasonable grounds
(a) has been obtained by the commission of an 
offence against this or any other Act of 
Parliament;
(b) has been used in the commission of an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament; or
(c) will afford evidence in respect of an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament.
(2) Every peace officer, and every public officer 
who has been appointed or designated to 
administer or enforce any federal or provincial law 
and whose duties include the enforcement of this 
or any other Act of Parliament, who is lawfully 
present in a place pursuant to a warrant or 
otherwise in the execution of duties may, without a 
warrant, seize any thing  that the officer believes on 
reasonable grounds
(a) has been obtained by the commission of an 
offence against this or any other Act of 
Parliament;
(b) has been used in the commission of an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament; or
(c) will afford evidence in respect of an offence 
against this or any other Act of Parliament.
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pornography discovered during  the 
first review of the computer files for 
fraud-related evidence. “[The analyst] 
was lawfully examining  the image 
files under the warrant when he 
unexpectedly saw images that were 
immediately recognizable as images 
of child pornography,” said Justice 
Blair.!“Thus, his detection of the child 
pornography images in those files met 
all the requirements of both the plain 
view doctrine and s. 489 of the Criminal Code.” The 
child pornography found in the image files 
discovered in the course of the initial search for 
fraud-related evidence in this case did not violate s. 
8  and the pol ice were ent i t led to seize 
them.!However, the video files of child pornography 
found in the subsequent search after the Crown 
advice had been obtained were not lawfully seized. 
The Court of Appeal explained:
!
First, the video files were not sitting “in plain 
view” following  the discovery of the child 
pornography image files and, while the plain 
view doctrine authorized [the analyst] to seize 
those image files, … it did not authorize him to 
conduct a further exploratory search for other 
evidence of child pornography.! Secondly, the 
videos were not inadvertently or unexpectedly 
discovered during the subsequent search he did 
conduct.! [The analyst] suspected he might find 
more evidence of child pornography if he did 
the further search, and he was deliberately 
looking for that evidence.!The doctrine therefore 
did not apply. Finally, to permit the plain view 
doctrine to operate in such circumstances would 
be to run the risk of overseizure, a risk to which 
electronic media searches are particularly 
susceptible and something  the court must guard 
against. [reference omitted, para. 67]
!
Nor did s. 489 apply.!Its reach also stopped with the 
discovery of the image files. “Implicit in the s. 489 
power is the premise that the law enforcement 
officer has come across or seen something  in the 
course of a lawful search,” said the Court.!“The law 
enforcement officer must have reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe that that something 
“will afford evidence” of a crime. [But here], the 
computer analyst did not come across or see the 
video files in the course of his 
initial seizure and search of the 
computer.! Like the plain view 
doctrine, s. 489 provides law 
enforcement agencies with a right 
to seize.!It does not provide them 
with a right to search for further 
evidence.”
s. 24(2) Charter
!
Since the seizure of the image files containing  child 
pornography found during  the initial search did not 
constitute a s. 8 breach, those !files were admissible 
and s. 24(2) did not arise in respect of them.! 
However, s. 24(2) did apply to the video files 
containing  child pornography found during  the 
subsequent search. Justice Blair concluded that the 
trial judge’s characterization of the Crown’s advice 
for the police to continue without a further warrant 
as “cavalier or reckless” was unnecessary and 
unfounded. Although the Crown’s advice turned out 
to be wrong, it did not follow that this ought to have 
been “obvious” from the beginning  and that the 
Crown’s advice was negligent, reckless or in wilful 
disregard of the accused’s Charter rights.!In the end, 
the Ontario Court of Appeal was satisfied in all the 
circumstances that the administration of justice 
would be brought into greater disrepute, in the long-
term, if the video file evidence was excluded rather 
than included:
!
The police acted in good faith throughout, 
believing they had the lawful right to continue 
their search of the computer.!While the Crown’s 
advice turned out to be incorrect in the end, the 
Crown did not fail to act in good faith.! Crimes 
involving  child pornography are among  the most 
abhorrent in society.!Society’s interest in having 
these charges tried on their merits, with the 
important, reliable and real evidence that is 
available being tendered, is very high. [para. 
102]
!
Balancing  all of the s. 24(2) factors, the evidence 
was admissible. The Crown’s appeal was allowed, 
the accused’s acquittal was set aside, and a new trial 
was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Like the plain view 
doctrine, s. 489 provides 
law enforcement agencies 
with a right to seize.!It does 
not provide them with a 
right to search for further 
evidence.” !
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TECHNICIAN’S OBSERVATIONS 
ADMISSIBLE: DID NOT ARISE 
FROM A CHARTER BREACH
R. v. Luthmedial, 2011 ONCA 585
!
After observing  the accused swerving 
from one lane to another and drive 
up on the sidewalk and almost hit 
another car, a citizen called 911 to 
alert the police. The responding 
police officer saw the accused’s vehicle swerving 
between lanes while traveling  about 40 km/h.! The 
van’s pace of travel was erratic; it would slow down 
and speed up.! A second officer also observed the 
vehicle swerving  between lanes and speeding  up 
and slowing  down. When the van stopped, the 
officers approached it and found its door open. The 
accused was in a semi-conscious state, looking 
“extremely sleepy”; he was not talking  or responding 
to comments made by the officers. An officer 
believed that the accused was intoxicated and on 
the verge of passing  out. He was removed from the 
van and arrested for impaired driving  on the basis of 
information provided by the citizen, his manner of 
driving, and his mannerisms as observed by the 
police once he had been stopped. The accused was 
taken to the police station and presented to a 
qualified technician for the purpose of taking  breath 
samples.!The technician made certain observations, 
such as a smell of alcohol on the accused’s breath, 
bloodshot and glassy eyes, slight unsteadiness when 
walking, and a very slight slurring  of speech.! He 
asked the accused several questions and obtained 
answers in response. Two breath samples were taken 
resulting in readings of 94 mg% and 85 mg%.
!
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused 
sought the exclusion of evidence on the basis of 
Charter breaches. Since the breathalyzer tests were 
warrantless searches, they were unreasonable unless 
the Crown could provide proper justification.! The 
trial judge found that the police did not have 
reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the 
accused had, as a result of the consumption of 
alcohol, committed the offence of impaired driving 
under s. 253 of the Criminal Code and therefore the 
police did not have the authority to arrest the 
accused under s. 495 !nor demand a breath sample 
under s. 254(3). As for the s. 9 issue, the trial judge 
found the accused’s detention not arbitrary. Although 
the arrest was inappropriate on the impaired driving 
charge, there were other grounds upon which to 
detain the accused and investigate further. However, 
the breathalyzer test constituted an unreasonable 
search and the test results were excluded as 
evidence. The answers to the technician’s questions 
were also excluded as they arose from, were part of, 
or were “derivative” of the breathalyzer testing. The 
technician’s observations, however, were ruled 
admissible. The observations did not arise from the 
unreasonable searches nor were they derivative of 
the breathalyzer tests. The accused was found guilty 
of impaired driving  on the basis of the observations 
made by the arresting  officers and the breathalyzer 
technician.
!
An appeal by the accused to the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice, arguing  that the!observations of the 
breathalyzer technician should be excluded,! was 
dismissed. In the accused’s view, the observations 
were conscripted evidence which should have been 
excluded as well. The appeal judge, however, 
disagreed. It was open to the trial judge to find that 
the technician’s observations did not arise from a 
Charter breach. The accused’s detention was not 
arbitrary and the officers were allowed to continue 
their investigation. Because the police may have 
decided, following  further investigation, to charge 
the accused with dangerous driving  it was open to 
the trial judge to find that the observations arose 
outside of the test. “The breathalyzer technician was 
a police officer involved in the continuing 
investigation which arose from the detention that 
was not arbitrary,” said the appeal judge.! “The 
observations he made did not arise from the test and 
were independent of it.! If another officer had been 
involved in the investigation, the same or similar 
observations would have been made.”!
!
The accused then challenged the appeal judge’s 
ruling  to the Ontario Court of Appeal. He again 
submitted that he was arbitrarily detained under s. 9 
of the Charter and, as a result, the observations of 
the breathalyzer technician as to his impairment 
should be excluded.
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In support of his argument the accused agreed that 
the initial stop by police was lawful due to his “bad 
driving”, but that the police did not observe the 
usual signs of impairment at the scene, such as 
glassy eyes, alcohol breath odour, or slurred speech. 
Therefore, there were no grounds to make a demand 
for a sample of his breath. In his opinion, his 
continued detention was an arbitrary one that 
contravened s. 9 of the Charter even if he would 
have been arrested in any event for dangerous 
driving. The Criminal Code has a scheme to deal 
with alcohol-related offences and the officers did not 
comply with it.! Since his continued detention was 
arbitrary, the technician’s observations ought to have 
been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, just as 
the results of the breathalyzer tests were excluded. !
!
But the Ontario Court of Appeal disagreed:
!
The [accused’s] initial detention was lawful 
pursuant to s. 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. !
The lack of reasonable grounds to arrest the 
[accused] for impaired driving did not convert 
his detention into an arbitrary detention.! The 
[accused’s] continued detention was justified to 
further the investigation into his horrendous 
driving.! The observations of the breathalyzer 
technician were admissible as evidence of 
impairment because they did not arise as a result 
of a Charter violation.!The observations made by 
the breathalyzer technician could have been 
made by any police officer at the station.! The 
[accused] was not arbitrarily detained.![para. 4]
!
As the Court of Appeal noted, there was “a strong 
line of authority [that] supports the proposition that a 
police officer’s observations of a lawfully detained 
suspect are not conscriptive evidence because they 
were not obtained through the suspect ’s 
participation.”!The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s note: Underlying  facts and judgment of the 
Ontario Superior Court of Justice was obtained from 
R. v. Luthmedial, 2009 CanLII 30966.
CN POLICE OFFICERS FALL WITH 
s. 2 CRIMINAL CODE 
DEFINITION
R. v. Lord, 2011 BCCA 295
!
A member of the Canadian National 
Railway Police Force (CNP) was 
patrolling  at a CN railway crossing 
when! he saw an individual driving  a 
van fail to stop at the crossing.! He 
pulled it over to issue a ticket to the vehicle’s driver. 
The accused, who was monitoring  the crossing, was 
of the view that the CNP did not have the 
jurisdiction to issue traffic tickets to motorists in 
British Columbia who were using  provincial 
roadways.!He approached the driver’s vehicle when 
the officer was writing  up a ticket and told him that 
the CNP  did not have the authority or jurisdiction to 
issue a ticket.!The officer asked the accused to stand 
back and allow him to carry out his duties, but he 
refused to do so. Instead he swore at the officer and 
pushed him.! When the officer tried to arrest the 
accused for obstructing  and assaulting  a peace 
officer, a struggle ensued. After back-up arrived, the 
accused was arrested and handcuffed.! He was 
convicted with assaulting  a peace officer, resisting  a 
peace officer, and assault with intent to resist lawful 
arrest, and sentenced to 30 days’ imprisonment 
followed by two years of probation.
!
The accused appealed his convictions to the British 
Columbia Supreme Court on several grounds. First, 
he argued that the underlying  policy, which permits 
the appointment of railway police, was long  overdue 
for a change.! In his view, it was not appropriate to 
have legislation that enabled a private corporation to 
have its own security guards appointed as police 
constables to enforce federal or provincial laws. 
Second, he submitted that the definition of a peace 
officer in the Criminal Code was too vague to 
enforce.! Further, the constable in this case was 
appointed under the Canada Transportation Act 
(CTA) by a justice of the Superior Court of Alberta 
a n d c o u l d n o t e n f o rc e l aw s i n B r i t i s h 
Columbia.! Finally, he argued that s.! 44(3) of the 
Railway Safety Act was ultra vires the federal 
government as an encroachment on provincial 
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powers over policing, pursuant to s.! 92(14) of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. All of these arguments, 
however, were rejected.
!
The accused then sought leave before the British 
Columbia Court of Appeal to appeal the Supreme 
Court judgment. Included in his grounds for appeal 
was that the appeal judge erring  in law in finding 
that CN police constables were “peace officers” as 
defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code and that the 
definition of peace officer was not void of vagueness 
as being  overly broad. In order for leave to be 
granted, the applicant, in this case the accused, 
needed to establish that the appeal involved a 
question of law, the issue was one of importance, 
and there was sufficient merit in the proposed 
appeal that it has a reasonable possibility of success.
!
Application of s.2 “peace officer” definition
!
Justice Hinkson, in chambers, concluded this ground 
of appeal!was one of law and one of importance, but 
there was no reasonable possibility it would succeed 
on appeal. The appeal judge had properly addressed 
the status of the CN constables. They were duly 
appointed as constables under the provisions of the 
CTA and it did not matter that the CTA was not 
specifically mentioned in the Criminal Code 
definition of peace officer. What mattered was that 
the constables were appointed as police constables 
and were “employed for the preservation and 
maintenance of the public peace”. Thus, CN 
constables fell within the definition of “peace 
officer” in s. 2 of the Criminal Code. Plus, the 
argument that private railway corporations should 
not be permitted to employ “police officers” for a 
variety of policy reasons was better left for 
Parliament, not the courts. Finally, the fact that one 
of the CN constables was appointed by an Alberta 
superior court judge did not result in a lack of 
jurisdiction to act as a peace officer in British 
Columbia. Once the constable was validly 
appointed according  to the statutory provisions, they 
had jurisdiction to act as such anywhere the railway 
owned, possessed, or administered property. 
Although appointed in Alberta, the officer may 
enforce the laws of Canada or any province insofar 
as their enforcement relates to the protection of 
property owned, possessed, or administered by CN 
or the protection of persons or property on or within 
500 metres of CN property.
!
The scope of the s. 2 peace officer definition
!
This issue was also one of law and arguably one of 
importance. The appeal judge found there was no 
question that the definition of “peace officer” was 
very broad. However, that did not necessarily make 
it “vague or unenforceable.” In this case, the appeal 
judge found there was no doubt that the CN officers 
were police constables at the time of the incident. 
They were duly appointed as such under the CTA 
and it did not matter that the CTA was not 
specifically mentioned in the Criminal Code 
definition. It was proved at trial that the two CN 
officers were appointed as police constables and 
were “employed for the preservation and 
maintenance of the public peace”. As a result, they 
fell within the definition of “peace officer” in s. 2 of 
the Criminal Code.
!
In his submission to the Court of Appeal, the 
accused emphasized that the appointment of police 
constables pursuant to s. 44 of the Railway Safety 
Act at the initiation of a multinational corporation 
created police constables who were immune from 
Charter scrutiny. But Justice Hinkson found this 
submission was without merit. “Section 44 of the 
Railway Safety Act requires a judge of a Provincial 
superior court to make the appointment, providing 
assurance that only suitable candidates will be 
appointed,” he said. “Once appointed, these 
constables exercise their authority pursuant to the 
statute under which they are appointed, and as such, 
are then subject to the same Charter scrutiny as any 
others who fall within the definition of peace officers 
found in s. 2 of the Code.” There was no possibility 
of success on this ground of appeal and leave was 
therefore not granted.
!
The other grounds of appeal were also dismissed! 
and the accused’s application for leave to appeal 
was refused.
!
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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LOSS OF EVIDENCE CONFINED 
TO CASES WHERE POLICE HAVE 
GROUNDS FOR WARRANT
R.!v.!Kelsy,!2011 ONCA 605
!
The accused and her two-year-old 
daughter spent the night at the sixth-
floor apartment of the child’s father, a 
drug  dealer. She was to start a new 
job the following  day and the 
apartment was near her daughter’s new daycare. At 
about 7:00 am the following  morning, the father left 
his apartment and was immediately set upon by two 
armed men who pistol-whipped him and wrapped 
him with duct tape.!The accused heard the struggle, 
went out on the apartment balcony, and asked the 
next-door neighbour to telephone the police. In 
response to the 911 call, uniformed police officers, 
including  members of the Emergency Task Force 
(ETF), arrived on the scene and made their way to 
the sixth floor.!As police began their preparations to 
clear the apartment, an ETF officer knocked on the 
door to the apartment and the 
accused came out with her 
daughter.! She was carrying  a 
knapsack and two shopping 
bags.!On direction of the police 
she dropped the bags. She said 
there was no one else in the 
apartment and asked if she 
could just get her knapsack, 
saying  it had her daughter’s 
belongings and she had to take 
her daughter to daycare.! The 
officer told her that she would 
get the knapsack as soon as ETF 
cleared the apartment because 
there were two males who had 
guns.!
The accused and her daughter were escorted 
downstairs by another police officer, but she was !
not searched at that time.! ETF went into the 
apartment and confirmed that no one was 
present.! Once the accused and her daughter were 
gone, the officer unzipped the knapsack and looked 
through it.! He found a loaded handgun and a 
magazine wrapped in a shirt.! As well, he found a 
scale, a pocket telephone book, and a plastic bag 
containing  heroin.! The knapsack also contained 
some papers belonging  to the accused, a purse and 
a passport in the name of another man. The clear 
shopping  bags contained children’s things.! The 
police later obtained a search warrant for the 
apartment but no further drugs were found.
!
At trial in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice the 
accused testified that on the previous evening, while 
she was alone with her daughter, she discovered a 
handgun in a dresser drawer.! When she heard 
someone trying  to get into the apartment she 
wrapped the handgun in a sweater and concealed it 
in the backpack to protect herself and her daughter. 
She was “happy and relieved” to see the police 
when she got outside of the apartment and she 
planned on giving  the gun to them.!Concerning  the 
search, the trial judge accepted the officer’s 
evidence as to why he opened the backpack. 
Although there was no evidence that the police had 
reasonable grounds to believe that the backpack 
contained contraband, evidence, or dangerous items 
– the officer was acting  on a hunch – 
the judge found the search of it was 
authorized by exigent circumstances.!“I 
find that while [the officer] had well 
founded concerns, they had not yet 
crystallized into reasonable grounds to 
believe the backpack contained 
evidence of criminal offences or 
something  that might compromise 
officer or public safety,” said the judge. 
“Out of an abundance of caution, in a 
dynamic and fast-moving  situation, [the 
officer] decided to take a look. This was 
not for the purposes of investigating 
[the accused]. Instead, he wanted to 
ensure that the bag  did not contain 
anything  that could be harmful to any 
of the officers on the scene, or to the many people 
who would be in circulation in the building, 
emerging  from their apartments to begin their day.” 
The judge also “found that the police were 
obviously acting  in the course of their duties when 
they responded to the 911 call and that the search of 
the backpack did not involve an unjustifiable use of 
powers in the circumstances.” This was a non-
invasive search prudently undertaken to ensure the 
“While the burden of proof 
of a Charter violation is 
ordinarily on the accused, 
once the accused has 
demonstrated that the 
search was a warrantless 
one, the Crown has the 
burden of showing that the 
search was, on a balance of 
probabilities, reasonable 
within the meaning of s. 8.” !
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safety of all concerned, both civilians and police 
officers. Based on a combination of the doctrine 
derived from the exigent circumstances cases and 
the justifiable use of police powers cases, the judge 
concluded that the police did not violate the 
accused’s s. 8  Charter rights. Even if he was wrong, 
the trial judge would have admi t t ed 
the evidence under s. 24(2). The 
accused was convicted by a jury 
o f p o s s e s s i n g  a l o a d e d 
prohibited firearm and heroin.
!
The accused appealed her 
convictions to the Ontario Court 
of Appeal. Justice Rosenberg, 
writing  the Court’s decision, 
concluded that the search of the 
accused’s bag  could not be 
justified on the basis of exigent 
circumstances nor was it a 
justifiable use of police powers, 
or by combining  the two 
concepts.! In his view, the police 
only had the power to seize 
the!bag  until the situation was no longer in a chaotic 
state.! Then, if there were no grounds to obtain a 
warrant to search the bag  or consent was not 
obtained, it had to be returned to the accused. 
“While the burden of proof of a Charter violation is 
ordinarily on the accused, once the accused has 
demonstrated that the search was a warrantless one, 
the Crown has the burden of showing  that the search 
was, on a balance of probabilities, reasonable within 
the meaning  of s. 8.!A search will be reasonable if it 
is authorized by law, if the law itself is reasonable 
and if the manner in which the search was carried 
out is reasonable,” said Justice Rosenberg.! “In this 
case, the only issue was whether the search of the 
[ a c c u s e d ’ s ] 
knapsack was 
authorized by 
law. As there 
was no statutory 
authorization for 
the search, any 
justification had 
to be found in 
t h e c o m m o n 
law.”
Exigent Circumstances
Although exigent circumstances have been 
recognized at common law as a basis for searching 
without a warrant, there must be a risk of the 
imminent loss or destruction of evidence or 
contraband before a warrant could be obtained, or 
there must be a concern for public or 
police safety. With respect to the 
imminent r isk of the loss or 
destruction of evidence underlying 
the exigent circumstances doctrine, 
the police would need reasonable 
grounds for the search, but because 
time does not permit the police to 
get a search warrant, they may 
proceed without one. Thus, “exigent 
circumstances do not justify a 
warrantless search for evidence or 
contraband on less than grounds for 
obtaining  a warrant,” said Justice 
Rosenberg. “It seems to me that at 
least when considering  the loss or 
destruction of evidence, the exigent 
circumstances doctrine should be confined to cases 
where the officer had grounds to obtain the prior 
judicial authorization but could not do so because 
of the risk of imminent loss or destruction of the 
evidence.” 
With respect to a concern for the safety of the public 
or the police as a basis of exigent circumstances, 
something  close to reasonable grounds appears to 
be a prerequisite to a valid search. For example, in 
the context of a field strip search for officer safety, 
reasonable grounds is a precondition. But there are 
o t h e r c i r c u m s t a n c e s wh e r e t h e e x i g e n t 
circumstances doctrine is invoked to justify a search 
for the purpose of protecting  the public or police 
officers on a lesser standard than reasonable 
grounds, such as an articulable cause or reasonable 
suspicion, as codified in s. 529.3(2)(a).
!
In this case, the doctrine of exigent circumstances 
could not justify the search of the! knapsack.! “The 
police did not have any grounds, let alone 
reasonable grounds, to believe that the knapsack 
contained evidence or contraband,” said Justice 
Rosenberg. “As the trial judge put it, [the officer] was 
“A search will be 
reasonable if it is 
authorized by law, if the 
law itself is reasonable 
and if the manner in which 
the search was carried 
out is reasonable.” !
“[W]hen considering the loss 
or destruction of evidence, 
the exigent circumstances 
doctrine should be confined 
to cases where the officer 
had grounds to obtain the 
prior judicial authorization 
but could not do so because 
of the risk of imminent loss 
or destruction of the 
evidence.” !
Volume 11 Issue 5 ! September/October 2011
PAGE 27
acting  on a hunch.” Nor was it impractical to obtain 
a warrant; the police could have seized the bag  until 
they obtained one.!The accused had been removed 
from the scene and there was no imminent risk of 
loss or destruction of evidence.! As for the safety 
branch of exigent circumstances, there were no 
grounds to believe that the knapsack contained 
anything  that threatened the safety of the public or 
the police officers. !Plus, the less intrusive procedure 
of simply seizing  the bag  until the situation had 
stabilized was available.
!
The Waterfield Test
!
There is a well-established doctrine recognizing  the 
exercise of police powers that comply with the 
common law Waterfield test. Where the police 
conduct constitutes a prima facie interference with a 
person’s property, the court will consider two 
questions:
1. Does the conduct fall within the general scope 
of any duty imposed by statute or recognized at 
common law?
2. Does the conduct involve a justifiable use of 
powers associated with the duty?
!
There was no doubt that the police were acting 
within the general scope of their duties to provide 
whatever assistance was required and to protect life 
when they attended at the apartment in response to 
the 911 call. However, Justice Rosenberg  did not 
agree that the search of the accused’s knapsack was 
a justifiable use of powers associated with this duty. 
The !justifiability of an officer's conduct depends on 
a number of factors including  the duty being 
performed, the extent to which some interference 
with individual liberty is necessitated in order to 
perform that duty, the importance of the 
performance of that duty to the public good, the 
liberty interfered with, and the nature and extent of 
the interference. “In this case, a search of [the] 
knapsack was not necessary and there were other 
reasonable alternatives by which the police could 
carry out their duties in response to the 911 call,” 
said the Court of Appeal.! The police could have 
seized the bag  until they had ensured that the 
accused and her daughter and anyone else in the 
building  were no longer in danger from the 
assailants. They could have returned the bag  and let 
her go on her way, sought her consent to search it, 
or obtained a search warrant if they had the requisite 
grounds.!She had been removed from the immediate 
area and the knapsack had been left where she had 
been told to drop it.! There was nothing  in the 
circumstances that necessitated searching  the 
knapsack.!So although the police had the power to 
forcibly enter the apartment to investigate the 911 
call and to locate the assailants, their authority did 
not extend to opening  the accused’s bags and 
backpack:
!
On the trial judge’s findings of fact that [the 
officer] acted on a hunch, this search could not 
be justified on the Waterfield test. Vague 
concerns because of the confusing  situation 
could not be used to justify an intrusion into the 
[accused’s] privacy interest in her bags.!  Later in 
his reasons, … the trial judge referred to “well-
founded” concerns and the officer’s desire to 
ensure that the bag  did not contain anything 
harmful. However, he made no finding  that 
these concerns reached the level of reasonable 
necessity.
!
Thus, the search in this case fails to meet the 
Waterfield tests on two grounds.! It was not 
reasonable, since there were was no basis for 
believing that the safety of the public or the 
police was at risk.! Second, the search was not 
reasonably necessary since there were other less 
intrusive measures that could have been used.! 
[paras. 49-50]
!
Combining  the Waterfield  Test with Exigent 
Circumstances
!
While the doctrines of exigent circumstances and 
the Waterfield test can, in some circumstances, be 
related and may overlap, Justice Rosenberg  found it 
preferable to keep them distinct in determining 
whether police conduct is justified.!He continued:
!
I say that primarily because of my concern that 
by combining  the two there is a risk that the 
reasonableness requirement that lies at the heart 
of the s. 8 analysis may be weakened.!
!
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The two doctrines are meant to address different 
c o n c e r n s a n d a r e c o n t e x t - s p e c i f i c .! 
Reasonableness in the exigent circumstances 
doctrine rests primarily on the fact that the 
officer did have grounds to obtain prior judicial 
authorization.!  The fact that it is not feasible to 
obtain a warrant merely sets the scene for 
possibly engaging  the exigent circumstances 
doctrine, it does not justify the search.!  While 
there is a vague and ill-defined basis for search 
in exigent circumstances involving  officer or 
public safety, even then there must be some 
reasonable basis for the search. Reasonableness 
in the Waterfield context rests on the reasonable 
necessity of the police action.! Again, the fact 
that officers were acting generally in the course 
of their duties merely sets the scene; but is only 
one half of the test that must be met. By 
combining the two doctrines and taking only 
certain elements from each, the core safeguard 
of reasonableness may be lost.![paras. 51-52]
!
The Court of Appeal then summarized its view of the 
application of s. 8 of the Charter to this case:
• Exigent circumstances should be primarily 
reserved for cases involving  imminent 
destruction of evidence or contraband and has 
largely been codified.
• The first branch of exigent circumstances, based 
on imminent destruction of evidence had no 
application, since the officer had no grounds to 
obtain a warrant.
• The second branch of exigent circumstances, 
based on police and officer safety could not 
apply since there was no finding  of, at the very 
least, articulable cause; this branch has largely 
been overtaken by the Waterfield doctrine.
• The search in this case should have been 
analyzed through the Waterfield doctrine.
• Whi le the 911 ca l l and the chao t ic 
circumstances gave the police grounds to 
temporarily seize the accused’s bags, a search of 
them was not reasonably necessary within the 
meaning of the Waterfield doctrine.
Thus, the police had breached the accused’s s. 8 
right to protection against unreasonable search and 
seizure.
!
s. 24(2) of the Charter
!
Although the accused’s rights were violated under s. 
8, the Ontario Court of Appeal nonetheless admitted 
the evidence. 
As for the seriousness of the 
Charter infringing  conduct, 
the breach of the accused’s 
rights was not serious and the police officer acted in 
good faith.!Although he had a hunch that something 
was wrong  with the backpack, he was also 
motivated by the need to return it to her so that she 
could be on her way with her daughter.!His actions 
occurred in the confusion of the 911 call and the 
mistake he made was an understandable one. He 
went too far in opening  the bag, but he was entitled 
to seize it until the scene had stabilized.! Plus the 
limits of permissible investigative procedures in the 
course of responding  to a 911 call were not entirely 
clear. As well, there were also extenuating 
circumstances; the officer was dealing  with a chaotic 
situation in which the primary concern was for the 
welfare of the public and the police.!This was not a 
case of flagrant disregard for Charter rights.
!
As for the impact of the 
Char te r b reach on the 
accused’s Charter-protected 
interests, this was a serious intrusion into the 
accused’s privacy; the backpack contained personal 
papers and her purse.!The impact on the accused’s 
privacy rights was, however, somewhat diminished. 
As for the third branch of the 
24(2) inquiry—society’s 
interest in an adjudication on 
the merits—the firearm, ammunition and drugs were 
reliable evidence, a factor favouring  admission. In 
this case, the factors relating  to the seriousness of the 
breach and the reliability of the evidence favoured 
admission, while the impact on the accused’s 
Charter-protected interests was serious and favoured 
exclusion. On balance, the repute of the justice 
system would not suffer from allowing  the firearm 
and the drugs to be admitted in evidence. The 
accused’s appeal from conviction was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
infringement?
impact?
interest?
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SAFETY CONCERN EXPLAINED 
WHY POLICE CALLED, BUT NOT 
WHY THEY SEARCHED
R.!v.!Stevens,!2011 ONCA 504
!
The accused and his girlfriend lived in 
an apartment.! A dispute arose 
between the landlord and the 
accused’s girlfriend over the failure to 
maintain the property and his 
girlfriend withheld the rent. The landlord obtained 
an eviction order, but the dispute was resolved 
through mediation. The landlord agreed not to 
enforce the eviction order if certain payments were 
made under a payment schedule.!Although the first 
payment was made on time, the landlord, through 
inadvertence, commenced the eviction process by 
faxing  instructions to a paralegal firm, which 
requested the sheriff’s office to proceed. Two sheriff’s 
officers attended at the! apartment to enforce the 
eviction order and knocked at the door, but received 
no response.! The superintendent opened the door 
with a master key and the sheriff’s officers noticed 
two gun cases in one of the bedrooms.!They did not 
know if the cases contained guns and did not touch 
them.! They also observed an Ontario Provincial 
Police shirt, a police badge from a Prince Edward 
Island provincial police, and a bullet-proof vest 
(without panels). After satisfying  themselves that the 
apartment was vacant, the officers signed the 
eviction order, the locks were changed, and the 
police were called while the superintendent and 
sheriff’s officers waited inside.
When two police officers arrived, the sheriff’s 
officers explained that they were executing  an 
eviction order and told the police about the gun 
cases. The police opened the gun cases and found 
firearms that were not properly stored or locked.!A 
decision was made not to search any further so a 
search warrant could be obtained while the officers 
waited in the apartment. When the accused arrived 
at the apartment, he was arrested as was his 
girlfriend who arrived some time later. A search 
warrant was obtained for the apartment and the 
police seized a number of items including  firearms 
and ammunition.!
!
At trial in the Ontario Court of Justice the accused’s 
motion to exclude the guns and ammunition seized 
by the police was dismissed.! The trial judge found 
that the sheriff’s officers were proceeding  under the 
authority of a valid eviction order and the police 
were initially assisting  them in what was essentially 
a civil matter.!The trial judge concluded that s. 8  of 
the Charter did not apply in the circumstances and 
the evidence was admitted. The accused was 
convicted on four counts of careless storage of a 
firearm and one count of careless storage of 
ammunition and he was given a suspended sentence 
and probation for 12 months.
!
The accused appealed his conviction to the Ontario 
Superior Court of Justice. The Crown conceded that 
the police were not exempt from the Charter when 
they assisted the sheriff’s officers in carrying  out an 
eviction. Since this was a warrantless search it was 
presumptively unreasonable.! The appeal judge 
found that the police acted reasonably in the 
circumstances and that the presumption of 
unreasonableness was rebutted.! She found “the 
police actions, including  the securing  of the 
apartment for several hours prior to the obtaining  of 
the warrant, were both subjectively and objectively 
reasonable in the circumstances and not … intrusive 
in relation to the [accused’s] privacy interests.” She 
also found that “the Crown [had] satisfied the onus 
of demonstrating  that exigent circumstances justified 
the entry by the police, the opening  of the gun cases 
and the securing  of the premises as they did, prior to 
obtaining  the warrant.”! Furthermore, even if there 
was a s. 8 breach, the evidence was admissible 
under s. 24(2).
!
The accused then appealed to the Ontario Court of 
Appeal, arguing  that both the sheriff’s officers and 
the police officers carried out unlawful searches in 
violation of s. 8  of the Charter.!Since sheriff’s officers 
were state actors who perform their duties in these 
circumstances under the authority of various 
statutes, it was submitted that they were bound by 
the Charter. In the accused’s view, the searches 
carried out by the sheriff’s officers and the police 
officers constituted searches of his home and his 
belongings to which he had a! reasonable 
expectation of privacy.! He contended there were no 
exigent circumstances that justified the police 
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opening  the gun cases before obtaining  a warrant. In 
his opinion the evidence should have been 
excluded. 
The Crown, on the other hand, suggested the sheriff’s 
officers entered the apartment pursuant 
to their statutory duty to enforce a 
facially valid eviction order, which 
objectively diminished the accused’s 
expectation of privacy in his apartment. 
The sheriff’s officers were entitled to 
conduct a lawful search of the apartment to provide 
the landlord with possession of it, free of persons 
and pets.! That search afforded them a plain view 
discovery of the two firearm cases and they were 
entitled to open them. The police entered the 
apartment with the implied consent of the landlord, 
who had re-acquired possession of the apartment 
through the eviction process.! Further, since the 
landlord had come into possession of the accused’s 
personal possessions by operation of law and the 
police had been called for assistance, the police had 
the implied consent of the landlord to open the two 
firearms cases in order to determine whether they 
posed a potential liability.! Moreover, the Crown 
suggested, as the appeal judge concluded, that the 
admission of the evidence would not bring  the 
administration of justice into disrepute.
!
An Unreasonable Search
Since the execution of the eviction order was the 
result of inadvertent and mistaken instructions given 
to the sheriff’s officers by the landlord, the accused 
continued to have an objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the apartment. He also 
retained his interest and privacy expectations in his 
personal property stored in it.! “Assuming  that the 
landlord were acting  under a valid eviction order, 
his building  superintendent was under an obligation 
to keep the [accused’s] belongings in a nearby place 
for 48  hours to permit the 
[accused] to claim them,” said 
Justice Armstrong.! “In so doing, 
the landlord was required to 
respect the [accused’s] privacy 
interest in his personal property.! If 
the landlord had a duty to make 
an inventory of the [accused’s] 
property, such a duty did not require the landlord to 
open the gun cases.!A simple notation of ‘two gun 
cases’ would have been sufficient.”
!
The “plain view” doctrine was also of no assistance. 
“While the gun cases were in plain 
view, the guns were not,” said Justice 
Armst rong. The accused had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the 
gun cases, which was objectively 
reasonable.
!
As for the sheriff’s officers, they were state actors and 
their conduct was subject to Charter scrutiny.! 
However, their conduct did not breach the accused’s !
s. 8  rights.! “The sheriff’s officers were carrying  out 
their statutory duties pursuant to an eviction order 
that was valid on its face,” the Court stated.! “Their 
role was to return the vacant premises to the 
landlord and it was within their  authority to walk 
through the apartment and to check for people or 
animals.!The sheriff’s officers were not engaged in a 
criminal investigation and, more importantly, they 
did not open the gun cases.!There was no unlawful 
search by the sheriff’s officers.” 
As for the conduct of the police officers, it breached 
s. 8  of the Charter. Although the safety concern was 
sufficient to explain why the police were called, it 
was insufficient to !justify why they opened the gun 
cases:
!
There were no exigent circumstances and, in 
particular, no threat of a breach of the peace.! 
There was no serious safety issue.! When the 
sheriff’s officers and later the police arrived, 
neither the [accused] nor his girlfriend were in 
the apartment. Once the locks had been 
changed, the [accused] could not access the gun 
cases.! The safety concern, if any, was not 
genuine and immediate.! The safety concern of 
the sheriff’s officers, as found by the trial judge, 
was sufficient to explain why the 
police were consulted, but was 
not grounds for the police to open 
the cases.! To the extent that the 
police were acting  pursuant to 
their common law duty to 
preserve the peace and prevent 
crime, in the circumstances – 
“While the gun cases 
were in plain view, 
the guns were not.”
“The distinction has to be 
made between the right to 
be present and the right to 
search.!The police had the 
former, but not the latter.”
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particularly the absence of any urgency – this 
common law duty does not excuse the police 
from their obligations under the Charter.
!
The landlord could not authorize the police to 
open the gun cases.!Neither express nor implied 
consent of the landlord justified the police in 
opening the gun cases.!The landlord could allow 
the police to enter the apartment and look 
around and while the gun cases were in plain 
view, the contents of the gun cases were not.!As 
indicated, the Crown concedes that, at that 
point, the police had no basis to obtain a search 
warrant.!The distinction has to be made between 
the right to be present and the right to 
search.! The police had the former, but not the 
latter.! [paras. 56-57]
!
The police officers, in opening  the gun cases, 
amounted to a s. 8 breach.!
!
s. 24(2) of the Charter
!
Seriousness of Charter Infringement: The search of 
the gun cases by police was without any lawful 
authority.! “They did not have a basis for obtaining a 
search warrant before opening the gun cases and there 
were simply no exigent or pressing circumstances to 
justify their acting as they did,” said Justice Armstrong. 
This factor favoured exclusion of the evidence.
!
The impact on the accused’s Charter protected 
interests:!The accused had a very high expectation of 
privacy in his home and in his personal property kept 
there.!This factor also favoured exclusion.!
!
Society’s interest in an  adjudication on the merits:! 
The evidence was both reliable and critical to the 
prosecution’s case.! As for the seriousness of the 
offence, gun violence is very serious.! But gun safety 
(like proper storage of firearms and ammunition), while 
important, is far less serious than violent crimes 
involving  guns. Nonetheless, this factor favoured 
admission.
!
In balancing  all three factors, the accused’s privacy 
interest in the circumstances was paramount and the 
evidence was excluded. The accused’s appeal was 
allowed, the evidence was excluded, his convictions 
were set aside, and verdicts of not guilty were 
entered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
!‘COMPUTER SYSTEM’ INCLUDES 
TEXT MESSAGING
R.!v.!Woodward,!2011 ONCA 610
!
The accused was convicted of 
several sex related offences in the 
Ontario Court of Justice, including 
luring  a child under the age of 14 
for the purpose of facilitating  the 
offence of sexual interference under s. 172.1 of the 
Criminal Code. In order to convict someone of an 
offence under s. 172.1(1), the communication in 
question must be through a means that satisfies the 
definition of “computer system” found in s.!342.1(2):
!
“computer system” means a device that, or a 
group of interconnected or related devices one 
or more of which,
(a)! ! contains computer programs or other data, 
and
(b)!!pursuant to computer programs,
(i)! performs logic and control, and
(ii) may perform any other function.
!
The accused appealed his child luring  conviction 
arguing, in part, that text messaging  via cellular 
telephones did not satisfy the actus reus of 
communicating  “by means of a computer system 
within the meaning  of s. 342.1(2).” In his view, the 
specific wording  used in the Criminal Code to define 
the term “computer system” and other related terms 
were not broad enough to apply to text messaging.
!
The Ontario Court of Appeal, rejected this argument. 
At trial there was evidence from a Corporate Security 
Manager at Bell Canada, who testified about the 
mechanics of text messaging. He explained how text 
messages are transmitted through Bell Canada’s 
internal cellular telephone network. His evidence 
was that text messaging  using  cellular phones 
involves a group of interconnected devices, one or 
more of which contains computer programs, and 
that these computer programs perform logic and 
control functions in transmitting  text messages, 
meeting  the second element of the definition of 
computer system in s. 342.1(2). His evidence 
addressed the issues of “logic” and “control” and 
provided a basis for concluding  that text messaging 
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using  cellular phones was captured by the second 
part of the definition of “computer system”.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
FLOWER BED INCLUDED WITHIN 
MEANING OF ‘PREMISES’
R. v. Le, 2011 MBCA 83
!
Following  the early morning  shooting 
death of a man in the area of a 
nightclub, police obtained a warrant 
to search “the premises … at 39 
Southlawn Stroll”, which was co-
owned by the accused and another individual. The 
Information to Obtain the search warrant stated that 
"things ... which will provide evidence of and 
relating  to the said offence are concealed in the 
premises of 39 Southlawn Stroll.” The search warrant 
identified the items to be searched for as a handgun, 
a sweatshirt, and a ball cap. In the appendix filed in 
support of the Information to Obtain, the police 
officer wrote:
!
I am requesting a Criminal Code Search Warrant 
to search the residence of 39 Southlawn Stroll 
Winnipeg Manitoba, including any outbuildings 
and garbage containers on the property. .... I 
believe, that there are reasonable and probable 
grounds to believe that Tam LE has stashed the 
firearm and clothing used during the murder of 
Miguel MONOZ [sic ] in his residence 39 
Southlawn Stroll Winnipeg. ....
!
When the search warrant was executed no one was 
home. While a locksmith was picking  the lock on 
the front door, a police officer went into the 
backyard and noticed a large granite rock near the 
rear fence. It appeared the rock had recently been 
moved out of the dirt in the flower bed. Suspicious 
that there might be something  of significance under 
the rock, the officer used a pitchfork that was nearby 
to turn the rock over. He then saw what he thought 
was a black stick, flipped it with the pitchfork, and 
discovered it was a .38  calibre handgun. !Police then 
discussed the meaning  of the word “premises,” as 
used in the warrant, and eventually concluded that 
the warrant included the yard. The gun was then 
photographed, removed from the soil, and seized. 
When it was discovered that the magazine was 
missing, a police officer ran his fingers through the 
soil and found the clip with a bullet inside about 
four inches or so below the surface of the ground 
and less than a foot away from where the gun was 
found. Police compared one of the bullets found in 
the victim’s body with the handgun, discovering  it 
was the murder weapon. The police also seized 
several documents from on top of the refrigerator in 
the kitchen of the house, which included a tax 
assessment and hydro account, all connecting  the 
accused to the residence. As a result of this and 
other evidence, the accused was charged with first 
degree murder.
!
At trial in the Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench the 
accused argued that the police required a second 
warrant to disturb the soil of the flower bed. 
Furthermore, the accused submitted that the search 
warrant did not permit the police to seize the 
documents and, in doing  so, violated s. 8. The trial 
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Search Warrant Grounds
“While each of these pieces of 
information comes with a caveat, 
the caveat sometimes amounting 
to a significant reservation, and 
sometimes being more in the nature of a quibble, 
nonetheless each of them adds something to the 
grounds. In my view, no single piece of information is 
sufficient, however, considered in total they are 
additive to the degree necessary for the conclusion 
that an authorizing Judicial Justice of the Peace could 
judicially assess them as amounting to reasonable 
grounds, or in other words, as providing a reasonable 
probability of discovery of evidence of the suspected 
offence; and in this case, that the residence likely 
housed a grow-op.” - British Columbia Supreme Court 
Justice Grist, R. v. Tran, 2011 BCSC 838 at para. 21. 
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judge concluded that the scope of the warrant 
permitted the police to search the flower bed in the 
yard and found no Charter breach. The trial judge 
also concluded that the seizure of the various 
documents fell within s. 489(1)(c) of the Criminal 
Code. Since there was no Charter breaches, there 
was no need to use s. 24(2) and exclude the 
evidence. The accused was convicted of first degree 
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without 
parole for at least 25 years. He then challenged his 
conviction to the Manitoba Court of Appeal arguing, 
among  many grounds, that the search violated his s. 
8 Charter rights.
!
Did “Premises” Include Flower Bed?
!
In this case, the search warrant was granted under s. 
487(1) of the Criminal Code (CC), which, upon 
reasonable grounds, authorizes the search of a 
building, receptacle or place. The terms “building,” 
“receptacle” or “place” are not defined in the CC, 
nor is the word “premises.” It neither appears in s. 
487 or the accompanying  Form 1. Here, Chief 
Justice Scott, speaking  for the Court of Appeal, 
identified the issue as “whether the warrant to search 
the ‘premises’ authorized the police to dig  around in 
the flower bed.” Because there was no express 
statutory definition for the word “premises,” he 
looked to dictionary definitions and other legal 
cases, both criminal and non-criminal, to help 
define its scope.!He also noted that the warrant was 
to search the “premises”, or, as he noted,it was a 
“civic address warrant”; it was not a “dwelling-
house” warrant:
!
In my opinion, a review of the case law leads to 
the conclusion that the term “dwelling-house” is 
narrower than the term “premises.” This also 
accords with common sense. In any event, even 
if it could be said that the warrant here was 
restricted to the [accused’s] residence at 39 
Southlawn Stroll, the curtilage principle can 
properly be relied upon to extend the scope of 
the warrant to include the land immediately 
surrounding  the building, including  the flower 
bed in the contiguous fenced backyard.
 
In my opinion, it can safely be said that in 
Canada, a warrant for premises identified by a 
civic address includes, at the very least, the 
curtilage or grounds around the primary or main 
building  on the property. On the facts here, this 
includes the flower bed located in the back of 
the fenced-in area, which the exhibits indicate 
could fairly be described as typical of many 
residential backyards found in the City of 
Winnipeg.
!
The warrant here, in my opinion, extended to 
the flower bed. The search was not akin to a 
warrantless perimeter search or other warrantless 
entry into the [accused’s] yard, as the [accused] 
argued. [paras. 93-96]
!
Furthermore, the police did not need a second 
warrant before conducting  a physical search of the 
flower bed. “Where a s. 487 search warrant is 
already in place, the police are not required to 
obtain a second warrant to enable them to disturb 
the soil around an accused's home where the actual 
location of the digging  is within the scope of the 
warrant,” said Chief Justice Scott. “A second warrant 
authorizing  a search of the flower bed here would 
have been ‘absurd’ and ‘superfluous’.” 
“[I]n Canada, a warrant for premises 
identified by a civic address includes, at 
the very least, the curtilage or grounds 
around the primary or main building on the 
property.” !
Meanings?
“premises” - 
“a house or building, along wi! its grounds” 
Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed.
“curtilage” -
“!e land or yard adjoining a house”
Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed.
“an area of land a"ached # a house and 
$orming one enclosure wi! it”
Oxford Dictionary of English 
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Chief Justice Scott summarized the case as follows:
!
It is therefore my conclusion that:
!
(1) the search warrant extended to the flower 
bed in the backyard of the property where 
the handgun was found, either through an 
interpretation of the term "premises" or an 
application of the curtilage doctrine; and
(2) a second warrant was not required in order 
for the police to lawfully disturb the soil 
(that is, dig up the handgun clip from the 
flower bed). [para. 100]
!
Were Documents Lawfully Seized?
!
The warrant did not identify documentation linking 
the accused to the targeted premises, as one of the 
items to be searched for. However, when executing 
the warrant, the police seized several documents 
located on the top of the refrigerator. “There can be 
no doubt that the police, when executing  a search 
warrant for specific items like guns or clothing, 
cannot rifle through personal papers at their 
discretion,” said Chief Justice Scott. !But in this case, 
the documents were properly seized under s. 489(1)
(c) of the CC.
!
Seizure of things not specified
s. 489. (1) Every person who executes 
a warrant may seize, in addition to the 
things mentioned in the warrant, any 
thing that the person believes on 
reasonable grounds ... (c)!  will afford 
evidence in respect of an offence 
against this or any other Act of 
Parliament.
!
Plus, the Court of Appeal noted, even if the 
documents were wrongly admitted as evidence it 
had no effect on the outcome of the trial. The 
accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
!
PLAIN VIEW OR NOT PLAIN 
VIEW: MORE DISCUSSION ON 
s. 489 CRIMINAL CODE
R.!v.!Bottineau & Kidman,!2011 ONCA 194
!
About two months after the starving 
death of a!five year old boy and the 
grave mistreatment of his six year 
old sister, the police executed a 
search warrant at the accuseds’ 
residence.!They were common-law spouses and the 
grandparents of the children. The warrant authorized 
the police to seize notes prepared by the accused 
Bottineau, the grandmother, at a meeting  held at the 
house.! The police had reason to believe that the 
notes summarized statements made by various 
individuals who had attended the meeting.! The 
police also had reason to believe that Bottineau was 
attempting  to find out what the other residents in the 
house would say to the police and to formulate a 
consistent, exculpatory version of the relevant 
events.!
!
Shortly after the search started, police found journals 
that recorded, in Bottineau’s handwriting, the daily 
activities of the grandchildren over a considerable 
time period. Subsequent examination of the journals 
revealed entries that expressed negative feelings 
towards the children. The journals were used by 
experts to assess Bottineau’s mental state as well as 
demonstrate evidence of animus she had towards 
the children. The accuseds were both convicted of 
second degree murder and forcible confinement. 
Bottineau received life imprisonment without parole 
ineligibility for 22 years, while her common law 
husband Kidman received life imprisonment without 
parole ineligibility for 20 years. They both appealed 
to Ontario’s top court.
!
As part of the challenge to her conviction, Bottineau 
submitted that the police did not have authority 
either under the warrant or s. 489(2) of the Criminal 
Code to seize the journals.! In her view, the seizure 
breached s. 8 of the Charter.!Since the breach was 
serious and an important privacy interest was 
compromised, the evidence, she contended, should 
have been excluded under s. 24(2).!
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Although the seizure of the 
journals was not authorized 
under the terms of the warrant, 
an assessment of the seizure’s 
legality turned on s. 489(2):
!
Every peace officer ... who 
is lawfully present in a 
p l a c e p u r s u a n t t o a 
warrant or otherwise in 
the execution of duties 
may, without a warrant, 
seize any thing that the 
officer believes on reasonable grounds ... 
(c) will afford evidence in respect of an 
offence against this or any other Act of 
Parliament.
“Section 489(2) does not authorize a search,” said 
the Court of Appeal.!“It does, however, expand the 
seizure powers beyond the material identified in a 
warrant to, among  other things, material that ‘will 
afford evidence in respect of an offence’.” Bottineau, 
however, argued that s. 489(2) was governed by the 
common law “plain view” doctrine, which imports 
strict preconditions. There is a requirement that “a 
seized article must be immediately obvious to the 
searching  party and must have been discovered 
inadvertently.” The Court of Appeal, however, 
disagreed. Section 489(2) is not simply a 
codification of the common law plain view doctrine:
!
We are not convinced that the complexities of 
the plain view doctrine should be read into the 
language of s. 489(2).! That language suggests 
that a determination of the lawfulness of the 
seizure of the journals would depend on 
whether the journals were found in the course of 
the search authorized by the warrant and fit the 
criterion in s. 489(2)(c).! It appears to us that a 
strong case can be made for the contention that 
the journals were seized during the search and 
that there were reasonable grounds to believe 
they would afford evidence of an offence. [para. 
77]
The Court went on to note that “if the journals were 
properly seized under s. 489(2), no case could be 
made out for their exclusion under s. 24(2) on the 
basis that the police did go beyond their powers by 
seizing  other documents that were not covered 
under s. 489(2).” However, because 
the trial judge did not make a 
finding  one way or the other about 
whether or not the seizure of 
journals went beyond the ambit of 
the warrant and s. 489(2), the Court 
of Appeal assumed the “best 
possible scenario” for the accused, 
that the journals were not properly 
seized and that they should have 
been excluded as evidence under s. 
24(2).!But even if the journals were 
improperly admitted into evidence, their admission 
had no impact on the verdict. The Crown’s case was 
overwhelming  and “the journals was but a small 
drop in a sea of evidence.” The curative proviso 
could safely be applied.
“The circumstances underlying this appeal are 
abhorrent beyond description.!Cruelly, and without 
remorse, the [accuseds] starved their five-year old 
grandson, Jeffrey Baldwin, to death and gravely 
mistreated his older sister, Judy.!... ‘[T]his case 
involves the relentless pursuit of a course of 
unyielding inhumanity and degradation.’” 
Ontario Court of Appeal
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“Section 489(2) does not 
authorize a search. It does, 
however, expand the seizure 
powers beyond the material 
identified in a warrant to, 
among other things, material 
that ‘will afford evidence in 
respect of an offence’.” !
LEGALLY SPEAKING:
Sentencing A Police Officer
“The message must be clearly sent 
that police officers who knowingly 
engage in the types of activities 
committed by the Accused will face 
potentially severe penalties.  The Accused knowingly 
embarked upon his predatory criminal activities with 
his eyes wide open.  He must have clearly appreciated 
the potential for serious consequences for his 
conduct. .” - British Columbia Provincial Court Judge Rideout, 
R. v. Hodson, 2011 BCPC 243 at para. 157 in sentencing former 
Vancouver Police Constable Peter Hodson to three years in a 
federal penitentiary for trafficking marihuana and two counts 
of breach of trust.
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APPLY NOW – Applications are now being 
accepted for the May 2012 Cohort.
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